1753 lines
88 KiB
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1753 lines
88 KiB
Plaintext
From fork-admin@xent.com Sat Sep 21 10:43:13 2002
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From: "Mr. FoRK" <fork_list@hotmail.com>
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To: <fork@example.com>
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References: <979BE8FE-CCF6-11D6-817E-000393A46DEA@alumni.caltech.edu>
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Subject: Re: sed /s/United States/Roman Empire/g
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List-Id: Friends of Rohit Khare <fork.xent.com>
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Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2002 21:34:51 -0700
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tests=AWL,KNOWN_MAILING_LIST,QUOTED_EMAIL_TEXT,REFERENCES,
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US_DOLLARS_2
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X-Spam-Level:
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"Free trade and free markets have proven their ability to lift whole
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societies out of poverty"
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I'm not a socio-political/history buff - does anybody have some clear
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examples?
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----- Original Message -----
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From: "Rohit Khare" <khare@alumni.caltech.edu>
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To: <fork@example.com>
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Sent: Friday, September 20, 2002 5:10 PM
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Subject: sed /s/United States/Roman Empire/g
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> > A world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human
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> > race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable.
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>
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> Absolutely correct. Perhaps the most fundamental thing to realize about
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> life on Earth today.
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>
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> The following is a fascinating document of official Government policy
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> that bears close reading. It is the aspirations of a wonderful nation in
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> an imperfect world.
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>
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> > The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations. It does,
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> > however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the
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> > future of the Muslim world. This is a struggle of ideas and this is an
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> > area where America must excel.
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>
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> I was recently at a lecture about the surprising success of Radio Sawa,
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> our new music-and-news channel for 15-30 year old Arabs. It's #1 in
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> practically every market it's entered, nearing 90% listenership in
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> Amman. And it's even beginning to be trusted for news, well past BBC and
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> taking share from every other government broadcaster.
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>
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> It is as hard to imagine America losing a war of ideas in the long-term
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> as it is to imagine America making any headway at all in the short term.
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>
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> Many of you may disagree, but I found the document below surprisingly
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> centrist. If you know the code, you can hear clearly partisan tones, re:
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> ICC, Taiwan Relations Act, etc. But, still, this is as much a Democratic
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> platform as not. Africa and AIDS take up more mindshare than I feared
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> they might.
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>
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> As you read, replace "United States" with "Roman Empire" and it may make
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> as much sense, in the long view of history. I don't know how proud to be
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> about that, but it is telling. Sometime I daydream that the President
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> might sit down with the nation with Perotista flip charts and explain to
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> our citizens the sheer vastness of our 700+ military installations
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> overseas and what they do for us. It would be a powerful education on
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> how engaged we are in the world around us.
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>
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> Heck, I'd love to see a real-time map of Federal expenditures around the
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> globe, a softly glowing necklace of embassies, carriers, arctic research
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> stations, hotels, golf courses, warehouses, libraries, clinics and all
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> the rest of the influence a trillion dollars here or there can buy.
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>
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> Of course, this still doesn't leave me any more comfortable with the
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> real news in this document: the Bush Doctrine for pre-emptive strikes.
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> I'd sooner repeal the Church amendments on covert action than permit
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> such a principle to be loosed upon the world.
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>
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> Rohit
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>
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> -----------------------------------------------------
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> September 20, 2002
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>
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> Full Text: Bush's National Security Strategy
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>
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> Following is the full text of President Bush's new national security
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> strategy. The document, entitled "The National Security Strategy of the
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> United States," will soon be transmitted to Congress as a declaration of
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> the Administration's policy.
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>
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> INTRODUCTION
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>
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> THE great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and
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> totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of
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> freedom -- and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom,
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> democracy, and free enterprise. In the twenty-first century, only
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> nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and
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> guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the
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> potential of their people and assure their future prosperity. People
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> everywhere want to say what they think; choose who will govern them;
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> worship as they please; educate their children -- male and female; own
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> property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom
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> are right and true for every person, in every society -- and the duty of
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> protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of
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> freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages.
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>
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> Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military
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> strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our
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> heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for
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> unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that
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> favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies
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> can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and
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> economic liberty. By making the world safer, we allow the people of the
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> world to make their own lives better. We will defend this just peace
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> against threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace
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> by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the
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> peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.
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>
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> Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental
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> commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed
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> dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great
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> industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of
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> individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less
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> than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to
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> penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies
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> against us.
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>
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> To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal --
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> from better homeland defenses and law enforcement to intelligence and
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> cutting off terrorist financing. The war against terrorists of global
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> reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help
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> nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will
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> hold to account nations that are compromised by terror -- because the
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> allies of terror are the enemies of civilization. The United States and
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> countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop
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> new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every
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> turn.
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>
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> The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism
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> and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking
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> weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing
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> so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to
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> succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other
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> means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny,
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> contain, and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous
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> technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America
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> will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We
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> cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must
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> be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans, using the best intelligence
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> and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those who
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> saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have
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> entered, the only path to safety is the path of action.
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>
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> As we defend the peace, we will also take advantage of an historic
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> opportunity to preserve the peace. Today, the international community
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> has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the
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> seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace
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> instead of continually prepare for war. Today, the world's great powers
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> find ourselves on the same side -- united by common dangers of terrorist
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> violence and chaos. The United States will build on these common
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> interests to promote global security. We are also increasingly united by
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> common values. Russia is in the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching
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> for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror. Chinese
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> leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only source of
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> national wealth. In time, they will find that social and political
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> freedom is the only source of national greatness. America will encourage
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> the advancement of democracy and economic openness in both nations,
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> because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and
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> international order. We will strongly resist aggression from other great
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> powers -- even as we welcome their peaceful pursuit of prosperity,
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> trade, and cultural advancement.
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>
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> Finally, the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend
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> the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring
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> the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to
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> every corner of the world. The events of September 11, 2001, taught us
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> that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our
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> national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people
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> into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and
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> corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and
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> drug cartels within their borders.
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>
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> The United States will stand beside any nation determined to build a
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> better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people. Free
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> trade and free markets have proven their ability to lift whole societies
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> out of poverty -- so the United States will work with individual
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> nations, entire regions, and the entire global trading community to
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> build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity.
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> The United States will deliver greater development assistance through
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> the New Millennium Challenge Account to nations that govern justly,
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> invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom. We will also
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> continue to lead the world in efforts to reduce the terrible toll of
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> AIDS and other infectious diseases.
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>
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> In building a balance of power that favors freedom, the United States is
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> guided by the conviction that all nations have important
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> responsibilities. Nations that enjoy freedom must actively fight terror.
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> Nations that depend on international stability must help prevent the
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> spread of weapons of mass destruction. Nations that seek international
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> aid must govern themselves wisely, so that aid is well spent. For
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> freedom to thrive, accountability must be expected and required.
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>
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> We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer,
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> better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply
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> the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed
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> to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade
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> Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as
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> other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment
|
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> these permanent institutions. In all cases, international obligations
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> are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to
|
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> rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment.
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>
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> Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of
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> every person -- in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has
|
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> been threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the
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> clashing wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and
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> it has been tested by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity
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> holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom's triumph over all
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> these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in
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> this great mission.
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>
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> I. Overview of America's International Strategy
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>
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>
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> "Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We
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> fight, as we always fight, for a just peace -- a peace that favors
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> liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists
|
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> and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among
|
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> the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and
|
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> open societies on every continent."
|
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>
|
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>
|
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>
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>
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>
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>
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> President Bush
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> West Point, New York
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> June 1, 2002
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>
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>
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>
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> The United States possesses unprecedented -- and unequaled -- strength
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> and influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the principles of
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> liberty, and the value of a free society, this position comes with
|
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> unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great
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> strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that
|
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> favors freedom.
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>
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> For most of the twentieth century, the world was divided by a great
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> struggle over ideas: destructive totalitarian visions versus freedom and
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> equality.
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>
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> That great struggle is over. The militant visions of class, nation, and
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> race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and
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> discredited. America is now threatened less by conquering states than we
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> are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by
|
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> catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must
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> defeat these threats to our Nation, allies, and friends.
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>
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> This is also a time of opportunity for America. We will work to
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> translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity,
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> and liberty. The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a
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> distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our
|
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> values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help
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> make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to
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> progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations
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> with other states, and respect for human dignity.
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>
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> And this path is not America's alone. It is open to all.
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>
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> To achieve these goals, the United States will:
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>
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> * champion aspirations for human dignity;
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>
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> * strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent
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> attacks against us and our friends;
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>
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> * work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
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>
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> * prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our
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> friends, with weapons of mass destruction;
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>
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> * ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and
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> free trade;
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>
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> * expand the circle of development by opening societies and building
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> the infrastructure of democracy;
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>
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> * develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of
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> global power; and
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>
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> * transform America's national security institutions to meet the
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> challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.
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>
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>
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> II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity
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>
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>
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> "Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the
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> language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require
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> different methods, but not different moralities."
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>
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>
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>
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>
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>
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> President Bush
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> West Point, New York
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> June 1, 2002
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>
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>
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>
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> In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we
|
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> stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because
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> these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation
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> owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. Fathers and
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> mothers in all societies want their children to be educated and to live
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> free from poverty and violence. No people on earth yearn to be
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> oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of
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> the secret police.
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>
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> America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human
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> dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state;
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> free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women;
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> religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.
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>
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> These demands can be met in many ways. America's constitution has served
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> us well. Many other nations, with different histories and cultures,
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> facing different circumstances, have successfully incorporated these
|
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> core principles into their own systems of governance. History has not
|
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> been kind to those nations which ignored or flouted the rights and
|
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> aspirations of their people.
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>
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> Our own history is a long struggle to live up to our ideals. But even in
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> our worst moments, the principles enshrined in the Declaration of
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> Independence were there to guide us. As a result, America is not just a
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> stronger, but is a freer and more just society.
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>
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> Today, these ideals are a lifeline to lonely defenders of liberty. And
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> when openings arrive, we can encourage change -- as we did in central
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> and eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991, or in Belgrade in 2000. When
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> we see democratic processes take hold among our friends in Taiwan or in
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> the Republic of Korea, and see elected leaders replace generals in Latin
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> America and Africa, we see examples of how authoritarian systems can
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> evolve, marrying local history and traditions with the principles we all
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> cherish.
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>
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> Embodying lessons from our past and using the opportunity we have today,
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> the national security strategy of the United States must start from
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> these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty.
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>
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> Our principles will guide our government's decisions about international
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> cooperation, the character of our foreign assistance, and the allocation
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> of resources. They will guide our actions and our words in international
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> bodies.
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>
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> We will:
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>
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> * speak out honestly about violations of the nonnegotiable demands of
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> human dignity using our voice and vote in international institutions to
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> advance freedom;
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>
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> * use our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who
|
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> struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward
|
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> democracy are rewarded for the steps they take;
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>
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> * make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key
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> themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation
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> from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights
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> to move toward a better future; and
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>
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> * take special efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience
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> and defend it from encroachment by repressive governments.
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>
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>
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> We will champion the cause of human dignity and oppose those who resist
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> it.
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>
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> III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent
|
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> Attacks Against Us and Our Friends
|
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>
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>
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> "Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have
|
|
> the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already
|
|
> clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been
|
|
> waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is
|
|
> peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on
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> the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of
|
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> our choosing."
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>
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>
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>
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>
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>
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> President Bush
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> Washington, D.C. (The National Cathedral)
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> September 14, 2001
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>
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>
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>
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> The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of
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> global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or
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> religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism -- premeditated,
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> politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.
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>
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> In many regions, legitimate grievances prevent the emergence of a
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> lasting peace. Such grievances deserve to be, and must be, addressed
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> within a political process. But no cause justifies terror. The United
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> States will make no concessions to terrorist demands and strike no deals
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> with them. We make no distinction between terrorists and those who
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> knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.
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>
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> The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in
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> our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly
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> elusive enemy over an extended period of time. Progress will come
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> through the persistent accumulation of successes -- some seen, some
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> unseen.
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>
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> Today our enemies have seen the results of what civilized nations can,
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> and will, do against regimes that harbor, support, and use terrorism to
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> achieve their political goals. Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition
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> forces continue to hunt down the Taliban and al-Qaida. But it is not
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> only this battlefield on which we will engage terrorists. Thousands of
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> trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South
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> America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia.
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>
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> Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist
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> organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command,
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> control, and communications; material support; and finances. This will
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> have a disabling effect upon the terrorists' ability to plan and operate.
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>
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> We will continue to encourage our regional partners to take up a
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> coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists. Once the regional
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> campaign localizes the threat to a particular state, we will help ensure
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> the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial
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> tools necessary to finish the task.
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>
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> The United States will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the
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> financing of terrorism. We will identify and block the sources of
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> funding for terrorism, freeze the assets of terrorists and those who
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> support them, deny terrorists access to the international financial
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> system, protect legitimate charities from being abused by terrorists,
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> and prevent the movement of terrorists' assets through alternative
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> financial networks.
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>
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> However, this campaign need not be sequential to be effective, the
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> cumulative effect across all regions will help achieve the results we
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> seek.
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>
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> We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by:
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>
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> * direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and
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> international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist
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> organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of
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> terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction
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> (WMD) or their precursors;
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>
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> * defending the United States, the American people, and our interests
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> at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it
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> reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to
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> enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate
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> to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by
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> acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing
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> harm against our people and our country; and
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>
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> * denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists
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> by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign
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> responsibilities.
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>
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>
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> We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international
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> terrorism. This includes:
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>
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> * using the full influence of the United States, and working closely
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> with allies and friends, to make clear that all acts of terrorism are
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> illegitimate so that terrorism will be viewed in the same light as
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> slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government
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> can condone or support and all must oppose;
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>
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> * supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim
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> world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote
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> terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation;
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>
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> * diminishing the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism by
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> enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources
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> on areas most at risk; and
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>
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> * using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of
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> information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of
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> those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism.
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>
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>
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> While we recognize that our best defense is a good offense we are also
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> strengthening America's homeland security to protect against and deter
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> attack.
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>
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> This Administration has proposed the largest government reorganization
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> since the Truman Administration created the National Security Council
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> and the Department of Defense. Centered on a new Department of Homeland
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> Security and including a new unified military command and a fundamental
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> reordering of the FBI, our comprehensive plan to secure the homeland
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> encompasses every level of government and the cooperation of the public
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> and the private sector.
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>
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> This strategy will turn adversity into opportunity. For example,
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> emergency management systems will be better able to cope not just with
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> terrorism but with all hazards. Our medical system will be strengthened
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> to manage not just bioterror, but all infectious diseases and
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> mass-casualty dangers. Our border controls will not just stop
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> terrorists, but improve the efficient movement of legitimate traffic.
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>
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> While our focus is protecting America, we know that to defeat terrorism
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> in today's globalized world we need support from our allies and friends.
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> Wherever possible, the United States will rely on regional organizations
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> and state powers to meet their obligations to fight terrorism. Where
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> governments find the fight against terrorism beyond their capacities, we
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> will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we and
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> our allies can provide.
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>
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> As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work
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> with international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as
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> non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the
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> humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to
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> rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people,
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> threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists
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>
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> In the war against global terrorism, we will never forget that we are
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> ultimately fighting for our democratic values and way of life. Freedom
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> and fear are at war, and there will be no quick or easy end to this
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> conflict. In leading the campaign against terrorism, we are forging new,
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> productive international relationships and redefining existing ones in
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> ways that meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.
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>
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> IV. Work with Others To Defuse Regional Conflicts
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>
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>
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> "We build a world of justice, or we will live in a world of coercion.
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> The magnitude of our shared responsibilities makes our disagreements
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> look so small."
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>
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>
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>
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>
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>
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> President Bush
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> Berlin, Germany
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> May 23, 2002
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>
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>
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>
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> Concerned nations must remain actively engaged in critical regional
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> disputes to avoid explosive escalation and minimize human suffering. In
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> an increasingly interconnected world, regional crisis can strain our
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> alliances, rekindle rivalries among the major powers, and create
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> horrifying affronts to human dignity. When violence erupts and states
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> falter, the United States will work with friends and partners to
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> alleviate suffering and restore stability.
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>
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> No doctrine can anticipate every circumstance in which U.S. action --
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> direct or indirect -- is warranted. We have finite political, economic,
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> and military resources to meet our global priorities. The United States
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> will approach each case with these strategic principles in mind:
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>
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> * The United States should invest time and resources into building
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> international relationships and institutions that can help manage local
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> crises when they emerge.
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>
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> * The United States should be realistic about its ability to help
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> those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when
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> people are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively.
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>
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>
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> Policies in several key regions offer some illustrations of how we will
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> apply these principles:
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>
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> The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical because of the toll of
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> human suffering, because of America's close relationship with the state
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> of Israel and key Arab states, and because of that region's importance
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> to other global priorities of the United States. There can be no peace
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> for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed
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> to an independent and democratic Palestine, living beside Israel in
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> peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a
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> government that serves their interests, and listens to their voices, and
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> counts their votes. The United States will continue to encourage all
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> parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and
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> comprehensive settlement to the conflict.
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>
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> The United States, the international donor community, and the World Bank
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> stand ready to work with a reformed Palestinian government on economic
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> development, increased humanitarian assistance and a program to
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> establish, finance, and monitor a truly independent judiciary. If
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> Palestinians embrace democracy, and the rule of law, confront
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> corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support
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> for the creation of a Palestinian state.
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>
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> Israel also has a large stake in the success of a democratic Palestine.
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> Permanent occupation threatens Israel's identity and democracy. So the
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> United States continues to challenge Israeli leaders to take concrete
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> steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state.
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> As there is progress towards security, Israel forces need to withdraw
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> fully to positions they held prior to September 28, 2000. And consistent
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> with the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee, Israeli settlement
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> activity in the occupied territories must stop. As violence subsides,
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> freedom of movement should be restored, permitting innocent Palestinians
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> to resume work and normal life. The United States can play a crucial
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> role but, ultimately, lasting peace can only come when Israelis and
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> Palestinians resolve the issues and end the conflict between them.
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>
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> In South Asia, the United States has also emphasized the need for India
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> and Pakistan to resolve their disputes. This administration invested
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> time and resources building strong bilateral relations with India and
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> Pakistan. These strong relations then gave us leverage to play a
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> constructive role when tensions in the region became acute. With
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> Pakistan, our bilateral relations have been bolstered by Pakistan's
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> choice to join the war against terror and move toward building a more
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> open and tolerant society. The Administration sees India's potential to
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> become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century
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> and has worked hard to transform our relationship accordingly. Our
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> involvement in this regional dispute, building on earlier investments in
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> bilateral relations, looks first to concrete steps by India and Pakistan
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> that can help defuse military confrontation.
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>
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> Indonesia took courageous steps to create a working democracy and
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> respect for the rule of law. By tolerating ethnic minorities, respecting
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> the rule of law, and accepting open markets, Indonesia may be able to
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> employ the engine of opportunity that has helped lift some of its
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> neighbors out of poverty and desperation. It is the initiative by
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> Indonesia that allows U.S. assistance to make a difference.
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>
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> In the Western Hemisphere we have formed flexible coalitions with
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> countries that share our priorities, particularly Mexico, Brazil,
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> Canada, Chile, and Colombia. Together we will promote a truly democratic
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> hemisphere where our integration advances security, prosperity,
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> opportunity, and hope. We will work with regional institutions, such as
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> the Summit of the Americas process, the Organization of American States
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> (OAS), and the Defense Ministerial of the Americas for the benefit of
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> the entire hemisphere.
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>
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> Parts of Latin America confront regional conflict, especially arising
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> from the violence of drug cartels and their accomplices. This conflict
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> and unrestrained narcotics trafficking could imperil the health and
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> security of the United States. Therefore we have developed an active
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> strategy to help the Andean nations adjust their economies, enforce
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> their laws, defeat terrorist organizations, and cut off the supply of
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> drugs, while -- as important -- we work to reduce the demand for drugs
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> in our own country.
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>
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> In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist
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> groups that challenge the security of the state and drug trafficking
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> activities that help finance the operations of such groups. We are
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> working to help Colombia defend its democratic institutions and defeat
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> illegal armed groups of both the left and right by extending effective
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> sovereignty over the entire national territory and provide basic
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> security to the Colombian people.
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>
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> In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war,
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> and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United
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> States -- preserving human dignity -- and our strategic priority --
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> combating global terror. American interests and American principles,
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> therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an
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> African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity.
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> Together with our European allies, we must help strengthen Africa's
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> fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous
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> borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence
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> infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists.
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>
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> An ever more lethal environment exists in Africa as local civil wars
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> spread beyond borders to create regional war zones. Forming coalitions
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> of the willing and cooperative security arrangements are key to
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> confronting these emerging transnational threats.
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>
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> Africa's great size and diversity requires a security strategy that
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> focuses bilateral engagement, and builds coalitions of the willing. This
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> administration will focus on three interlocking strategies for the
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> region:
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>
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> * countries with major impact on their neighborhood such as South
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> Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia are anchors for regional engagement
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> and require focused attention;
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>
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> * coordination with European allies and international institutions is
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> essential for constructive conflict mediation and successful peace
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> operations; and
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>
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> * Africa's capable reforming states and sub-regional organizations
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> must be strengthened as the primary means to address transnational
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> threats on a sustained basis.
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>
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>
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> Ultimately the path of political and economic freedom presents the
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> surest route to progress in sub-Saharan Africa, where most wars are
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> conflicts over material resources and political access often tragically
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> waged on the basis of ethnic and religious difference. The transition to
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> the African Union with its stated commitment to good governance and a
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> common responsibility for democratic political systems offers
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> opportunities to strengthen democracy on the continent.
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>
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> V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends
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> with Weapons of Mass Destruction
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>
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>
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> "The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and
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> technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear
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> weapons, along with ballistic missile technology -- when that occurs,
|
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> even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to
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> strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and
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> have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the
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> capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends -- and
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> we will oppose them with all our power."
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>
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>
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>
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>
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>
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> President Bush
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> West Point, New York
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> June 1, 2002
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>
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>
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>
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> The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States -- with our
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> allies and friends -- to emphasize deterrence of the enemy's use of
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> force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. With the
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> collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security
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> environment has undergone profound transformation.
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>
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> Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our
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> relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the
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> balance of terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear
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> arsenals on both sides; and cooperation in areas such as
|
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> counterterrorism and missile defense that until recently were
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> inconceivable.
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>
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> But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists.
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> None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power
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> that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and
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> motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain
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> destructive powers hitherto available only to the world's strongest
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> states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass
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> destruction against us, make today's security environment more complex
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> and dangerous.
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>
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> In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue
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> states that, while different in important ways, share a number of
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> attributes. These states:
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>
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> * brutalize their own people and squander their national resources
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> for the personal gain of the rulers;
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>
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> * display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors,
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> and callously violate international treaties to which they are party;
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>
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> * are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with
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> other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively
|
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> to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes;
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>
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> * sponsor terrorism around the globe; and
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>
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> * reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything
|
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> for which it stands.
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>
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>
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> At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq's
|
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> designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against
|
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> Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear
|
|
> weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become
|
|
> the world's principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested
|
|
> increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal.
|
|
> Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as
|
|
> well. These states' pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has
|
|
> become a looming threat to all nations.
|
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>
|
|
> We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients
|
|
> before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction
|
|
> against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must
|
|
> take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new
|
|
> partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military
|
|
> forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective
|
|
> missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence
|
|
> collection and analysis.
|
|
>
|
|
> Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes:
|
|
>
|
|
> * Proactive counterproliferation efforts. We must deter and defend
|
|
> against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key
|
|
> capabilities -- detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce
|
|
> capabilities -- are integrated into our defense transformation and our
|
|
> homeland security systems. Counterproliferation must also be integrated
|
|
> into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of
|
|
> our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed
|
|
> adversaries.
|
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>
|
|
> * Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and
|
|
> terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies and expertise
|
|
> necessary for weapons of mass destruction. We will enhance diplomacy,
|
|
> arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction
|
|
> assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD, and when
|
|
> necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials. We will
|
|
> continue to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their
|
|
> increased political and financial support for nonproliferation and
|
|
> threat reduction programs. The recent G-8 agreement to commit up to $20
|
|
> billion to a global partnership against proliferation marks a major step
|
|
> forward.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD
|
|
> use, whether by terrorists or hostile states. Minimizing the effects of
|
|
> WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such
|
|
> weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading
|
|
> enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends. The United States
|
|
> must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our
|
|
> forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked.
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of
|
|
> this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the
|
|
> United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have
|
|
> in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy
|
|
> of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be
|
|
> caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option.
|
|
> We cannot let our enemies strike first.
|
|
>
|
|
> * In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we
|
|
> faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an
|
|
> effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of
|
|
> retaliation is far less likely to work against leaders of rogue states
|
|
> more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and
|
|
> the wealth of their nations.
|
|
>
|
|
> * In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered
|
|
> weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who
|
|
> used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons
|
|
> of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and
|
|
> military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also
|
|
> allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our
|
|
> allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior
|
|
> of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means
|
|
> of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a
|
|
> terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the
|
|
> targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death
|
|
> and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between
|
|
> states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to
|
|
> action.
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer
|
|
> an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves
|
|
> against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars
|
|
> and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption
|
|
> on the existence of an imminent threat -- most often a visible
|
|
> mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.
|
|
>
|
|
> We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and
|
|
> objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not
|
|
> seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would
|
|
> fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terrorism and, potentially, the use
|
|
> of weapons of mass destruction -- weapons that can be easily concealed
|
|
> and delivered covertly and without warning.
|
|
>
|
|
> The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian
|
|
> population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law
|
|
> of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001,
|
|
> mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and
|
|
> these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired
|
|
> and used weapons of mass destruction.
|
|
>
|
|
> The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions
|
|
> to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the
|
|
> threat, the greater is the risk of inaction -- and the more compelling
|
|
> the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if
|
|
> uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To
|
|
> forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United
|
|
> States will, if necessary, act preemptively.
|
|
>
|
|
> The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging
|
|
> threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression.
|
|
> Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek
|
|
> the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot
|
|
> remain idle while dangers gather.
|
|
>
|
|
> We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our
|
|
> actions. To support preemptive options, we will:
|
|
>
|
|
> * build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide
|
|
> timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;
|
|
>
|
|
> * coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the
|
|
> most dangerous threats; and
|
|
>
|
|
> * continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to
|
|
> conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat
|
|
> to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our
|
|
> actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.
|
|
>
|
|
> VI. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and
|
|
> Free Trade.
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> "When nations close their markets and opportunity is hoarded by a
|
|
> privileged few, no amount -- no amount -- of development aid is ever
|
|
> enough. When nations respect their people, open markets, invest in
|
|
> better health and education, every dollar of aid, every dollar of trade
|
|
> revenue and domestic capital is used more effectively."
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> President Bush
|
|
> Monterrey, Mexico
|
|
> March 22, 2002
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing
|
|
> prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth
|
|
> supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher
|
|
> incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs
|
|
> economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it
|
|
> reinforces the habits of liberty.
|
|
>
|
|
> We will promote economic growth and economic freedom beyond America's
|
|
> shores. All governments are responsible for creating their own economic
|
|
> policies and responding to their own economic challenge. We will use our
|
|
> economic engagement with other countries to underscore the benefits of
|
|
> policies that generate higher productivity and sustained economic
|
|
> growth, including:
|
|
>
|
|
> * pro-growth legal and regulatory policies to encourage business
|
|
> investment, innovation, and entrepreneurial activity;
|
|
>
|
|
> * tax policies -- particularly lower marginal tax rates -- that
|
|
> improve incentives for work and investment;
|
|
>
|
|
> * rule of law and intolerance of corruption so that people are
|
|
> confident that they will be able to enjoy the fruits of their economic
|
|
> endeavors;
|
|
>
|
|
> * strong financial systems that allow capital to be put to its most
|
|
> efficient use;
|
|
>
|
|
> * sound fiscal policies to support business activity;
|
|
>
|
|
> * investments in health and education that improve the well-being and
|
|
> skills of the labor force and population as a whole; and
|
|
>
|
|
> * free trade that provides new avenues for growth and fosters the
|
|
> diffusion of technologies and ideas that increase productivity and
|
|
> opportunity.
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> The lessons of history are clear: market economies, not
|
|
> command-and-control economies with the heavy hand of government, are the
|
|
> best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty. Policies that further
|
|
> strengthen market incentives and market institutions are relevant for
|
|
> all economies -- industrialized countries, emerging markets, and the
|
|
> developing world.
|
|
>
|
|
> A return to strong economic growth in Europe and Japan is vital to U.S.
|
|
> national security interests. We want our allies to have strong economies
|
|
> for their own sake, for the sake of the global economy, and for the sake
|
|
> of global security. European efforts to remove structural barriers in
|
|
> their economies are particularly important in this regard, as are
|
|
> Japan's efforts to end deflation and address the problems of
|
|
> non-performing loans in the Japanese banking system. We will continue to
|
|
> use our regular consultations with Japan and our European partners --
|
|
> including through the Group of Seven (G-7) -- to discuss policies they
|
|
> are adopting to promote growth in their economies and support higher
|
|
> global economic growth.
|
|
>
|
|
> Improving stability in emerging markets is also key to global economic
|
|
> growth. International flows of investment capital are needed to expand
|
|
> the productive potential of these economies. These flows allow emerging
|
|
> markets and developing countries to make the investments that raise
|
|
> living standards and reduce poverty. Our long-term objective should be a
|
|
> world in which all countries have investment-grade credit ratings that
|
|
> allow them access to international capital markets and to invest in
|
|
> their future.
|
|
>
|
|
> We are committed to policies that will help emerging markets achieve
|
|
> access to larger capital flows at lower cost. To this end, we will
|
|
> continue to pursue reforms aimed at reducing uncertainty in financial
|
|
> markets. We will work actively with other countries, the International
|
|
> Monetary Fund (IMF), and the private sector to implement the G-7 Action
|
|
> Plan negotiated earlier this year for preventing financial crises and
|
|
> more effectively resolving them when they occur.
|
|
>
|
|
> The best way to deal with financial crises is to prevent them from
|
|
> occurring, and we have encouraged the IMF to improve its efforts doing
|
|
> so. We will continue to work with the IMF to streamline the policy
|
|
> conditions for its lending and to focus its lending strategy on
|
|
> achieving economic growth through sound fiscal and monetary policy,
|
|
> exchange rate policy, and financial sector policy.
|
|
>
|
|
> The concept of "free trade" arose as a moral principle even before it
|
|
> became a pillar of economics. If you can make something that others
|
|
> value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something
|
|
> that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the
|
|
> freedom for a person -- or a nation -- to make a living. To promote free
|
|
> trade, the Unites States has developed a comprehensive strategy:
|
|
>
|
|
> * Seize the global initiative. The new global trade negotiations we
|
|
> helped launch at Doha in November 2001 will have an ambitious agenda,
|
|
> especially in agriculture, manufacturing, and services, targeted for
|
|
> completion in 2005. The United States has led the way in completing the
|
|
> accession of China and a democratic Taiwan to the World Trade
|
|
> Organization. We will assist Russia's preparations to join the WTO.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Press regional initiatives. The United States and other democracies
|
|
> in the Western Hemisphere have agreed to create the Free Trade Area of
|
|
> the Americas, targeted for completion in 2005. This year the United
|
|
> States will advocate market-access negotiations with its partners,
|
|
> targeted on agriculture, industrial goods, services, investment, and
|
|
> government procurement. We will also offer more opportunity to the
|
|
> poorest continent, Africa, starting with full use of the preferences
|
|
> allowed in the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and leading to free
|
|
> trade.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Move ahead with bilateral free trade agreements. Building on the
|
|
> free trade agreement with Jordan enacted in 2001, the Administration
|
|
> will work this year to complete free trade agreements with Chile and
|
|
> Singapore. Our aim is to achieve free trade agreements with a mix of
|
|
> developed and developing countries in all regions of the world.
|
|
> Initially, Central America, Southern Africa, Morocco, and Australia will
|
|
> be our principal focal points.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Renew the executive-congressional partnership. Every
|
|
> administration's trade strategy depends on a productive partnership with
|
|
> Congress. After a gap of 8 years, the Administration reestablished
|
|
> majority support in the Congress for trade liberalization by passing
|
|
> Trade Promotion Authority and the other market opening measures for
|
|
> developing countries in the Trade Act of 2002. This Administration will
|
|
> work with Congress to enact new bilateral, regional, and global trade
|
|
> agreements that will be concluded under the recently passed Trade
|
|
> Promotion Authority.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Promote the connection between trade and development. Trade
|
|
> policies can help developing countries strengthen property rights,
|
|
> competition, the rule of law, investment, the spread of knowledge, open
|
|
> societies, the efficient allocation of resources, and regional
|
|
> integration -- all leading to growth, opportunity, and confidence in
|
|
> developing countries. The United States is implementing The Africa
|
|
> Growth and Opportunity Act to provide market-access for nearly all goods
|
|
> produced in the 35 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. We will make more
|
|
> use of this act and its equivalent for the Caribbean Basin and continue
|
|
> to work with multilateral and regional institutions to help poorer
|
|
> countries take advantage of these opportunities. Beyond market access,
|
|
> the most important area where trade intersects with poverty is in public
|
|
> health. We will ensure that the WTO intellectual property rules are
|
|
> flexible enough to allow developing nations to gain access to critical
|
|
> medicines for extraordinary dangers like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
|
|
> malaria.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Enforce trade agreements and laws against unfair practices.
|
|
> Commerce depends on the rule of law; international trade depends on
|
|
> enforceable agreements. Our top priorities are to resolve ongoing
|
|
> disputes with the European Union, Canada, and Mexico and to make a
|
|
> global effort to address new technology, science, and health regulations
|
|
> that needlessly impede farm exports and improved agriculture. Laws
|
|
> against unfair trade practices are often abused, but the international
|
|
> community must be able to address genuine concerns about government
|
|
> subsidies and dumping. International industrial espionage which
|
|
> undermines fair competition must be detected and deterred.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Help domestic industries and workers adjust. There is a sound
|
|
> statutory framework for these transitional safeguards which we have used
|
|
> in the agricultural sector and which we are using this year to help the
|
|
> American steel industry. The benefits of free trade depend upon the
|
|
> enforcement of fair trading practices. These safeguards help ensure that
|
|
> the benefits of free trade do not come at the expense of American
|
|
> workers. Trade adjustment assistance will help workers adapt to the
|
|
> change and dynamism of open markets.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Protect the environment and workers. The United States must foster
|
|
> economic growth in ways that will provide a better life along with
|
|
> widening prosperity. We will incorporate labor and environmental
|
|
> concerns into U.S. trade negotiations, creating a healthy "network"
|
|
> between multilateral environmental agreements with the WTO, and use the
|
|
> International Labor Organization, trade preference programs, and trade
|
|
> talks to improve working conditions in conjunction with freer trade.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Enhance energy security. We will strengthen our own energy security
|
|
> and the shared prosperity of the global economy by working with our
|
|
> allies, trading partners, and energy producers to expand the sources and
|
|
> types of global energy supplied, especially in the Western Hemisphere,
|
|
> Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region. We will also continue to
|
|
> work with our partners to develop cleaner and more energy efficient
|
|
> technologies.
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> Economic growth should be accompanied by global efforts to stabilize
|
|
> greenhouse gas concentrations associated with this growth, containing
|
|
> them at a level that prevents dangerous human interference with the
|
|
> global climate. Our overall objective is to reduce America's greenhouse
|
|
> gas emissions relative to the size of our economy, cutting such
|
|
> emissions per unit of economic activity by 18 percent over the next 10
|
|
> years, by the year 2012. Our strategies for attaining this goal will be
|
|
> to:
|
|
>
|
|
> * remain committed to the basic U.N. Framework Convention for
|
|
> international cooperation;
|
|
>
|
|
> * obtain agreements with key industries to cut emissions of some of
|
|
> the most potent greenhouse gases and give transferable credits to
|
|
> companies that can show real cuts;
|
|
>
|
|
> * develop improved standards for measuring and registering emission
|
|
> reductions;
|
|
>
|
|
> * promote renewable energy production and clean coal technology, as
|
|
> well as nuclear power -- which produces no greenhouse gas emissions,
|
|
> while also improving fuel economy for U.S. cars and trucks;
|
|
>
|
|
> * increase spending on research and new conservation technologies, to
|
|
> a total of $4.5 billion -- the largest sum being spent on climate change
|
|
> by any country in the world and a $700 million increase over last year's
|
|
> budget; and
|
|
>
|
|
> * assist developing countries, especially the major greenhouse gas
|
|
> emitters such as China and India, so that they will have the tools and
|
|
> resources to join this effort and be able to grow along a cleaner and
|
|
> better path.
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building
|
|
> the Infrastructure of Democracy
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> "In World War II we fought to make the world safer, then worked to
|
|
> rebuild it. As we wage war today to keep the world safe from terror, we
|
|
> must also work to make the world a better place for all its citizens."
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> President Bush
|
|
> Washington, D.C. (Inter-American
|
|
> Development Bank)
|
|
> March 14, 2002
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> A world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human
|
|
> race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable. Including
|
|
> all of the world's poor in an expanding circle of development -- and
|
|
> opportunity -- is a moral imperative and one of the top priorities of
|
|
> U.S. international policy.
|
|
>
|
|
> Decades of massive development assistance have failed to spur economic
|
|
> growth in the poorest countries. Worse, development aid has often served
|
|
> to prop up failed policies, relieving the pressure for reform and
|
|
> perpetuating misery. Results of aid are typically measured in dollars
|
|
> spent by donors, not in the rates of growth and poverty reduction
|
|
> achieved by recipients. These are the indicators of a failed strategy.
|
|
>
|
|
> Working with other nations, the United States is confronting this
|
|
> failure. We forged a new consensus at the U.N. Conference on Financing
|
|
> for Development in Monterrey that the objectives of assistance -- and
|
|
> the strategies to achieve those objectives -- must change.
|
|
>
|
|
> This Administration's goal is to help unleash the productive potential
|
|
> of individuals in all nations. Sustained growth and poverty reduction is
|
|
> impossible without the right national policies. Where governments have
|
|
> implemented real policy changes we will provide significant new levels
|
|
> of assistance. The United States and other developed countries should
|
|
> set an ambitious and specific target: to double the size of the world's
|
|
> poorest economies within a decade.
|
|
>
|
|
> The United States Government will pursue these major strategies to
|
|
> achieve this goal:
|
|
>
|
|
> * Provide resources to aid countries that have met the challenge of
|
|
> national reform. We propose a 50 percent increase in the core
|
|
> development assistance given by the United States. While continuing our
|
|
> present programs, including humanitarian assistance based on need alone,
|
|
> these billions of new dollars will form a new Millennium Challenge
|
|
> Account for projects in countries whose governments rule justly, invest
|
|
> in their people, and encourage economic freedom. Governments must fight
|
|
> corruption, respect basic human rights, embrace the rule of law, invest
|
|
> in health care and education, follow responsible economic policies, and
|
|
> enable entrepreneurship. The Millennium Challenge Account will reward
|
|
> countries that have demonstrated real policy change and challenge those
|
|
> that have not to implement reforms.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Improve the effectiveness of the World Bank and other development
|
|
> banks in raising living standards. The United States is committed to a
|
|
> comprehensive reform agenda for making the World Bank and the other
|
|
> multilateral development banks more effective in improving the lives of
|
|
> the world's poor. We have reversed the downward trend in U.S.
|
|
> contributions and proposed an 18 percent increase in the U.S.
|
|
> contributions to the International Development Association (IDA) -- the
|
|
> World Bank's fund for the poorest countries -- and the African
|
|
> Development Fund. The key to raising living standards and reducing
|
|
> poverty around the world is increasing productivity growth, especially
|
|
> in the poorest countries. We will continue to press the multilateral
|
|
> development banks to focus on activities that increase economic
|
|
> productivity, such as improvements in education, health, rule of law,
|
|
> and private sector development. Every project, every loan, every grant
|
|
> must be judged by how much it will increase productivity growth in
|
|
> developing countries.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Insist upon measurable results to ensure that development
|
|
> assistance is actually making a difference in the lives of the world's
|
|
> poor. When it comes to economic development, what really matters is that
|
|
> more children are getting a better education, more people have access to
|
|
> health care and clean water, or more workers can find jobs to make a
|
|
> better future for their families. We have a moral obligation to measure
|
|
> the success of our development assistance by whether it is delivering
|
|
> results. For this reason, we will continue to demand that our own
|
|
> development assistance as well as assistance from the multilateral
|
|
> development banks has measurable goals and concrete benchmarks for
|
|
> achieving those goals. Thanks to U.S. leadership, the recent IDA
|
|
> replenishment agreement will establish a monitoring and evaluation
|
|
> system that measures recipient countries' progress. For the first time,
|
|
> donors can link a portion of their contributions to IDA to the
|
|
> achievement of actual development results, and part of the U.S.
|
|
> contribution is linked in this way. We will strive to make sure that the
|
|
> World Bank and other multilateral development banks build on this
|
|
> progress so that a focus on results is an integral part of everything
|
|
> that these institutions do.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Increase the amount of development assistance that is provided in
|
|
> the form of grants instead of loans. Greater use of results-based grants
|
|
> is the best way to help poor countries make productive investments,
|
|
> particularly in the social sectors, without saddling them with
|
|
> ever-larger debt burdens. As a result of U.S. leadership, the recent IDA
|
|
> agreement provided for significant increases in grant funding for the
|
|
> poorest countries for education, HIV/AIDS, health, nutrition, water,
|
|
> sanitation, and other human needs. Our goal is to build on that progress
|
|
> by increasing the use of grants at the other multilateral development
|
|
> banks. We will also challenge universities, nonprofits, and the private
|
|
> sector to match government efforts by using grants to support
|
|
> development projects that show results.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Open societies to commerce and investment. Trade and investment are
|
|
> the real engines of economic growth. Even if government aid increases,
|
|
> most money for development must come from trade, domestic capital, and
|
|
> foreign investment. An effective strategy must try to expand these flows
|
|
> as well. Free markets and free trade are key priorities of our national
|
|
> security strategy.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Secure public health. The scale of the public health crisis in poor
|
|
> countries is enormous. In countries afflicted by epidemics and pandemics
|
|
> like HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, growth and development will be
|
|
> threatened until these scourges can be contained. Resources from the
|
|
> developed world are necessary but will be effective only with honest
|
|
> governance, which supports prevention programs and provides effective
|
|
> local infrastructure. The United States has strongly backed the new
|
|
> global fund for HIV/AIDS organized by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
|
|
> and its focus on combining prevention with a broad strategy for
|
|
> treatment and care. The United States already contributes more than
|
|
> twice as much money to such efforts as the next largest donor. If the
|
|
> global fund demonstrates its promise, we will be ready to give even more.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Emphasize education. Literacy and learning are the foundation of
|
|
> democracy and development. Only about 7 percent of World Bank resources
|
|
> are devoted to education. This proportion should grow. The United States
|
|
> will increase its own funding for education assistance by at least 20
|
|
> percent with an emphasis on improving basic education and teacher
|
|
> training in Africa. The United States can also bring information
|
|
> technology to these societies, many of whose education systems have been
|
|
> devastated by AIDS.
|
|
>
|
|
> * Continue to aid agricultural development. New technologies,
|
|
> including biotechnology, have enormous potential to improve crop yields
|
|
> in developing countries while using fewer pesticides and less water.
|
|
> Using sound science, the United States should help bring these benefits
|
|
> to the 800 million people, including 300 million children, who still
|
|
> suffer from hunger and malnutrition.
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers
|
|
> of Global Power
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> "We have our best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th
|
|
> century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead
|
|
> of prepare for war."
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> President Bush
|
|
> West Point, New York
|
|
> June 1, 2002
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions -- as
|
|
> broad as practicable -- of states able and willing to promote a balance
|
|
> of power that favors freedom. Effective coalition leadership requires
|
|
> clear priorities, an appreciation of others' interests, and consistent
|
|
> consultations among partners with a spirit of humility.
|
|
>
|
|
> There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can
|
|
> accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies
|
|
> and friends in Canada and Europe. Europe is also the seat of two of the
|
|
> strongest and most able international institutions in the world: the
|
|
> North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has, since its
|
|
> inception, been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European
|
|
> security, and the European Union (EU), our partner in opening world
|
|
> trade.
|
|
>
|
|
> The attacks of September 11 were also an attack on NATO, as NATO itself
|
|
> recognized when it invoked its Article V self-defense clause for the
|
|
> first time. NATO's core mission -- collective defense of the
|
|
> transatlantic alliance of democracies -- remains, but NATO must develop
|
|
> new structures and capabilities to carry out that mission under new
|
|
> circumstances. NATO must build a capability to field, at short notice,
|
|
> highly mobile, specially trained forces whenever they are needed to
|
|
> respond to a threat against any member of the alliance.
|
|
>
|
|
> The alliance must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened,
|
|
> creating coalitions under NATO's own mandate, as well as contributing to
|
|
> mission-based coalitions. To achieve this, we must:
|
|
>
|
|
> * expand NATO's membership to those democratic nations willing and
|
|
> able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests;
|
|
>
|
|
> * ensure that the military forces of NATO nations have appropriate
|
|
> combat contributions to make in coalition warfare;
|
|
>
|
|
> * develop planning processes to enable those contributions to become
|
|
> effective multinational fighting forces;
|
|
>
|
|
> * take advantage of the technological opportunities and economies of
|
|
> scale in our defense spending to transform NATO military forces so that
|
|
> they dominate potential aggressors and diminish our vulnerabilities;
|
|
>
|
|
> * streamline and increase the flexibility of command structures to
|
|
> meet new operational demands and the associated requirements of
|
|
> training, integrating, and experimenting with new force configurations;
|
|
> and
|
|
>
|
|
> * maintain the ability to work and fight together as allies even as
|
|
> we take the necessary steps to transform and modernize our forces.
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> If NATO succeeds in enacting these changes, the rewards will be a
|
|
> partnership as central to the security and interests of its member
|
|
> states as was the case during the Cold War. We will sustain a common
|
|
> perspective on the threats to our societies and improve our ability to
|
|
> take common action in defense of our nations and their interests. At the
|
|
> same time, we welcome our European allies' efforts to forge a greater
|
|
> foreign policy and defense identity with the EU, and commit ourselves to
|
|
> close consultations to ensure that these developments work with NATO. We
|
|
> cannot afford to lose this opportunity to better prepare the family of
|
|
> transatlantic democracies for the challenges to come.
|
|
>
|
|
> The attacks of September 11 energized America's Asian alliances.
|
|
> Australia invoked the ANZUS Treaty to declare the September 11 was an
|
|
> attack on Australia itself, following that historic decision with the
|
|
> dispatch of some of the world's finest combat forces for Operation
|
|
> Enduring Freedom. Japan and the Republic of Korea provided unprecedented
|
|
> levels of military logistical support within weeks of the terrorist
|
|
> attack. We have deepened cooperation on counter-terrorism with our
|
|
> alliance partners in Thailand and the Philippines and received
|
|
> invaluable assistance from close friends like Singapore and New Zealand.
|
|
>
|
|
> The war against terrorism has proven that America's alliances in Asia
|
|
> not only underpin regional peace and stability, but are flexible and
|
|
> ready to deal with new challenges. To enhance our Asian alliances and
|
|
> friendships, we will:
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> * look to Japan to continue forging a leading role in regional and
|
|
> global affairs based on our common interests, our common values, and our
|
|
> close defense and diplomatic cooperation;
|
|
>
|
|
> * work with South Korea to maintain vigilance towards the North while
|
|
> preparing our alliance to make contributions to the broader stability of
|
|
> the region over the longer-term;
|
|
>
|
|
> * build on 50 years of U.S.-Australian alliance cooperation as we
|
|
> continue working together to resolve regional and global problems -- as
|
|
> we have so many times from the Battle of Leyte Gulf to Tora Bora;
|
|
>
|
|
> * maintain forces in the region that reflect our commitments to our
|
|
> allies, our requirements, our technological advances, and the strategic
|
|
> environment; and
|
|
>
|
|
> * build on stability provided by these alliances, as well as with
|
|
> institutions such as ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
|
|
> forum, to develop a mix of regional and bilateral strategies to manage
|
|
> change in this dynamic region.
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> We are attentive to the possible renewal of old patterns of great power
|
|
> competition. Several potential great powers are now in the midst of
|
|
> internal transition -- most importantly Russia, India, and China. In all
|
|
> three cases, recent developments have encouraged our hope that a truly
|
|
> global consensus about basic principles is slowly taking shape.
|
|
>
|
|
> With Russia, we are already building a new strategic relationship based
|
|
> on a central reality of the twenty-first century: the United States and
|
|
> Russia are no longer strategic adversaries. The Moscow Treaty on
|
|
> Strategic Reductions is emblematic of this new reality and reflects a
|
|
> critical change in Russian thinking that promises to lead to productive,
|
|
> long-term relations with the Euro-Atlantic community and the United
|
|
> States. Russia's top leaders have a realistic assessment of their
|
|
> country's current weakness and the policies -- internal and external --
|
|
> needed to reverse those weaknesses. They understand, increasingly, that
|
|
> Cold War approaches do not serve their national interests and that
|
|
> Russian and American strategic interests overlap in many areas.
|
|
>
|
|
> United States policy seeks to use this turn in Russian thinking to
|
|
> refocus our relationship on emerging and potential common interests and
|
|
> challenges. We are broadening our already extensive cooperation in the
|
|
> global war on terrorism. We are facilitating Russia's entry into the
|
|
> World Trade Organization, without lowering standards for accession, to
|
|
> promote beneficial bilateral trade and investment relations. We have
|
|
> created the NATO-Russia Council with the goal of deepening security
|
|
> cooperation among Russia, our European allies, and ourselves. We will
|
|
> continue to bolster the independence and stability of the states of the
|
|
> former Soviet Union in the belief that a prosperous and stable
|
|
> neighborhood will reinforce Russia's growing commitment to integration
|
|
> into the Euro-Atlantic community.
|
|
>
|
|
> At the same time, we are realistic about the differences that still
|
|
> divide us from Russia and about the time and effort it will take to
|
|
> build an enduring strategic partnership. Lingering distrust of our
|
|
> motives and policies by key Russian elites slows improvement in our
|
|
> relations. Russia's uneven commitment to the basic values of free-market
|
|
> democracy and dubious record in combating the proliferation of weapons
|
|
> of mass destruction remain matters of great concern. Russia's very
|
|
> weakness limits the opportunities for cooperation. Nevertheless, those
|
|
> opportunities are vastly greater now than in recent years -- or even
|
|
> decades.
|
|
>
|
|
> The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral
|
|
> relationship with India based on a conviction that U.S. interests
|
|
> require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest
|
|
> democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative
|
|
> government. India is moving toward greater economic freedom as well. We
|
|
> have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through
|
|
> the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest
|
|
> in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia.
|
|
>
|
|
> Differences remain, including over the development of India's nuclear
|
|
> and missile programs, and the pace of India's economic reforms. But
|
|
> while in the past these concerns may have dominated our thinking about
|
|
> India, today we start with a view of India as a growing world power with
|
|
> which we have common strategic interests. Through a strong partnership
|
|
> with India, we can best address any differences and shape a dynamic
|
|
> future.
|
|
>
|
|
> The United States relationship with China is an important part of our
|
|
> strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific
|
|
> region. We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous
|
|
> China. The democratic development of China is crucial to that future.
|
|
> Yet, a quarter century after beginning the process of shedding the worst
|
|
> features of the Communist legacy, China's leaders have not yet made the
|
|
> next series of fundamental choices about the character of their state.
|
|
> In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its
|
|
> neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated
|
|
> path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national
|
|
> greatness. In time, China will find that social and political freedom is
|
|
> the only source of that greatness.
|
|
>
|
|
> The United States seeks a constructive relationship with a changing
|
|
> China. We already cooperate well where our interests overlap, including
|
|
> the current war on terrorism and in promoting stability on the Korean
|
|
> peninsula. Likewise, we have coordinated on the future of Afghanistan
|
|
> and have initiated a comprehensive dialogue on counter-terrorism and
|
|
> similar transitional concerns. Shared health and environmental threats,
|
|
> such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, challenge us to promote jointly the
|
|
> welfare of our citizens.
|
|
>
|
|
> Addressing these transnational threats will challenge China to become
|
|
> more open with information, promote the development of civil society,
|
|
> and enhance individual human rights. China has begun to take the road to
|
|
> political openness, permitting many personal freedoms and conducting
|
|
> village-level elections, yet remains strongly committed to national
|
|
> one-party rule by the Communist Party. To make that nation truly
|
|
> accountable to its citizen's needs and aspirations, however, much work
|
|
> remains to be done. Only by allowing the Chinese people to think,
|
|
> assemble, and worship freely can China reach its full potential.
|
|
>
|
|
> Our important trade relationship will benefit from China's entry into
|
|
> the World Trade Organization, which will create more export
|
|
> opportunities and ultimately more jobs for American farmers, workers,
|
|
> and companies. China is our fourth largest trading partner, with over
|
|
> $100 billion in annual two-way trade. The power of market principles and
|
|
> the WTO's requirements for transparency and accountability will advance
|
|
> openness and the rule of law in China to help establish basic
|
|
> protections for commerce and for citizens. There are, however, other
|
|
> areas in which we have profound disagreements. Our commitment to the
|
|
> self-defense of Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act is one. Human
|
|
> rights is another. We expect China to adhere to its nonproliferation
|
|
> commitments. We will work to narrow differences where they exist, but
|
|
> not allow them to preclude cooperation where we agree.
|
|
>
|
|
> The events of September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the context for
|
|
> relations between the United States and other main centers of global
|
|
> power, and opened vast, new opportunities. With our long-standing allies
|
|
> in Europe and Asia, and with leaders in Russia, India, and China, we
|
|
> must develop active agendas of cooperation lest these relationships
|
|
> become routine and unproductive.
|
|
>
|
|
> Every agency of the United States Government shares the challenge. We
|
|
> can build fruitful habits of consultation, quiet argument, sober
|
|
> analysis, and common action. In the long-term, these are the practices
|
|
> that will sustain the supremacy of our common principles and keep open
|
|
> the path of progress.
|
|
>
|
|
> IX. Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the
|
|
> Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> "Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not touch
|
|
> its source. America is successful because of the hard work, creativity,
|
|
> and enterprise of our people."
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> President Bush
|
|
> Washington, D.C. (Joint Session of Congress)
|
|
> September 20, 2001
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> The major institutions of American national security were designed in a
|
|
> different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be
|
|
> transformed.
|
|
>
|
|
> It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength.
|
|
> We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. Our military's
|
|
> highest priority is to defend the United States. To do so effectively,
|
|
> our military must:
|
|
>
|
|
> * assure our allies and friends;
|
|
>
|
|
> * dissuade future military competition;
|
|
>
|
|
> * deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and
|
|
>
|
|
> * decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> The unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces, and their
|
|
> forward presence, have maintained the peace in some of the world's most
|
|
> strategically vital regions. However, the threats and enemies we must
|
|
> confront have changed, and so must our forces. A military structured to
|
|
> deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on
|
|
> how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might
|
|
> occur. We will channel our energies to overcome a host of operational
|
|
> challenges.
|
|
>
|
|
> The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound
|
|
> symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends. Through our
|
|
> willingness to use force in our own defense and in defense of others,
|
|
> the United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of
|
|
> power that favors freedom. To contend with uncertainty and to meet the
|
|
> many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases
|
|
> and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as
|
|
> well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment
|
|
> of U.S. forces.
|
|
>
|
|
> Before the war in Afghanistan, that area was low on the list of major
|
|
> planning contingencies. Yet, in a very short time, we had to operate
|
|
> across the length and breadth of that remote nation, using every branch
|
|
> of the armed forces. We must prepare for more such deployments by
|
|
> developing assets such as advanced remote sensing, long-range precision
|
|
> strike capabilities, and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces.
|
|
> This broad portfolio of military capabilities must also include the
|
|
> ability to defend the homeland, conduct information operations, ensure
|
|
> U.S. access to distant theaters, and protect critical U.S.
|
|
> infrastructure and assets in outer space.
|
|
>
|
|
> Innovation within the armed forces will rest on experimentation with new
|
|
> approaches to warfare, strengthening joint operations, exploiting U.S.
|
|
> intelligence advantages, and taking full advantage of science and
|
|
> technology. We must also transform the way the Department of Defense is
|
|
> run, especially in financial management and recruitment and retention.
|
|
> Finally, while maintaining near-term readiness and the ability to fight
|
|
> the war on terrorism, the goal must be to provide the President with a
|
|
> wider range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of
|
|
> coercion against the United States, our allies, and our friends.
|
|
>
|
|
> We know from history that deterrence can fail; and we know from
|
|
> experience that some enemies cannot be deterred. The United States must
|
|
> and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy --
|
|
> whether a state or non-state actor -- to impose its will on the United
|
|
> States, our allies, or our friends. We will maintain the forces
|
|
> sufficient to support our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces
|
|
> will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a
|
|
> military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the
|
|
> United States.
|
|
>
|
|
> Intelligence -- and how we use it -- is our first line of defense
|
|
> against terrorists and the threat posed by hostile states. Designed
|
|
> around the priority of gathering enormous information about a massive,
|
|
> fixed object -- the Soviet bloc -- the intelligence community is coping
|
|
> with the challenge of following a far more complex and elusive set of
|
|
> targets.
|
|
>
|
|
> We must transform our intelligence capabilities and build new ones to
|
|
> keep pace with the nature of these threats. Intelligence must be
|
|
> appropriately integrated with our defense and law enforcement systems
|
|
> and coordinated with our allies and friends. We need to protect the
|
|
> capabilities we have so that we do not arm our enemies with the
|
|
> knowledge of how best to surprise us. Those who would harm us also seek
|
|
> the benefit of surprise to limit our prevention and response options and
|
|
> to maximize injury.
|
|
>
|
|
> We must strengthen intelligence warning and analysis to provide
|
|
> integrated threat assessments for national and homeland security. Since
|
|
> the threats inspired by foreign governments and groups may be conducted
|
|
> inside the United States, we must also ensure the proper fusion of
|
|
> information between intelligence and law enforcement.
|
|
>
|
|
> Initiatives in this area will include:
|
|
>
|
|
> * strengthening the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence
|
|
> to lead the development and actions of the Nation's foreign intelligence
|
|
> capabilities;
|
|
>
|
|
> * establishing a new framework for intelligence warning that provides
|
|
> seamless and integrated warning across the spectrum of threats facing
|
|
> the nation and our allies;
|
|
>
|
|
> * continuing to develop new methods of collecting information to
|
|
> sustain our intelligence advantage;
|
|
>
|
|
> * investing in future capabilities while working to protect them
|
|
> through a more vigorous effort to prevent the compromise of intelligence
|
|
> capabilities; and
|
|
>
|
|
> * collecting intelligence against the terrorist danger across the
|
|
> government with all-source analysis.
|
|
>
|
|
>
|
|
> As the United States Government relies on the armed forces to defend
|
|
> America's interests, it must rely on diplomacy to interact with other
|
|
> nations. We will ensure that the Department of State receives funding
|
|
> sufficient to ensure the success of American diplomacy. The State
|
|
> Department takes the lead in managing our bilateral relationships with
|
|
> other governments. And in this new era, its people and institutions must
|
|
> be able to interact equally adroitly with non-governmental organizations
|
|
> and international institutions. Officials trained mainly in
|
|
> international politics must also extend their reach to understand
|
|
> complex issues of domestic governance around the world, including public
|
|
> health, education, law enforcement, the judiciary, and public diplomacy.
|
|
>
|
|
> Our diplomats serve at the front line of complex negotiations, civil
|
|
> wars, and other humanitarian catastrophes. As humanitarian relief
|
|
> requirements are better understood, we must also be able to help build
|
|
> police forces, court systems, and legal codes, local and provincial
|
|
> government institutions, and electoral systems. Effective international
|
|
> cooperation is needed to accomplish these goals, backed by American
|
|
> readiness to play our part.
|
|
>
|
|
> Just as our diplomatic institutions must adapt so that we can reach out
|
|
> to others, we also need a different and more comprehensive approach to
|
|
> public information efforts that can help people around the world learn
|
|
> about and understand America. The war on terrorism is not a clash of
|
|
> civilizations. It does, however, reveal the clash inside a civilization,
|
|
> a battle for the future of the Muslim world. This is a struggle of ideas
|
|
> and this is an area where America must excel.
|
|
>
|
|
> We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet
|
|
> our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired
|
|
> by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the
|
|
> International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend
|
|
> to Americans and which we do not accept. We will work together with
|
|
> other nations to avoid complications in our military operations and
|
|
> cooperation, through such mechanisms as multilateral and bilateral
|
|
> agreements that will protect U.S. nationals from the ICC. We will
|
|
> implement fully the American Servicemembers Protection Act, whose
|
|
> provisions are intended to ensure and enhance the protection of U.S.
|
|
> personnel and officials.
|
|
>
|
|
> We will make hard choices in the coming year and beyond to ensure the
|
|
> right level and allocation of government spending on national security.
|
|
> The United States Government must strengthen its defenses to win this
|
|
> war. At home, our most important priority is to protect the homeland for
|
|
> the American people.
|
|
>
|
|
> Today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is
|
|
> diminishing. In a globalized world, events beyond America's borders have
|
|
> a greater impact inside them. Our society must be open to people, ideas,
|
|
> and goods from across the globe. The characteristics we most cherish --
|
|
> our freedom, our cities, our systems of movement, and modern life -- are
|
|
> vulnerable to terrorism. This vulnerability will persist long after we
|
|
> bring to justice those responsible for the September eleventh attacks.
|
|
> As time passes, individuals may gain access to means of destruction that
|
|
> until now could be wielded only by armies, fleets, and squadrons. This
|
|
> is a new condition of life. We will adjust to it and thrive -- in spite
|
|
> of it.
|
|
>
|
|
> In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgment, and
|
|
> interests of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act
|
|
> apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require. When we
|
|
> disagree on particulars, we will explain forthrightly the grounds for
|
|
> our concerns and strive to forge viable alternatives. We will not allow
|
|
> such disagreements to obscure our determination to secure together, with
|
|
> our allies and our friends, our shared fundamental interests and values.
|
|
>
|
|
> Ultimately, the foundation of American strength is at home. It is in the
|
|
> skills of our people, the dynamism of our economy, and the resilience of
|
|
> our institutions. A diverse, modern society has inherent, ambitious,
|
|
> entrepreneurial energy. Our strength comes from what we do with that
|
|
> energy. That is where our national security begins.
|
|
>
|
|
|
|
|