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From ygingras@ygingras.net Wed Sep 4 18:59:01 2002
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From: Yannick Gingras <ygingras@ygingras.net>
To: secprog@securityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Secure Sofware Key
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 06:52:07 -0400
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References: <20020829204345.91D1833986@LINPDC.eclipsys.qc.ca>
<20020903192326.C9DA533986@LINPDC.eclipsys.qc.ca>
<002c01c253c3$5d522d70$740aa8c0@fmmobile>
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> Software vendors have been trying since forever to prevent software piracy.
> Remember when you had to enter a specific word from a specific page of the
> software manual, which was printed on dark maroon paper so that it could
> not be photocopied? Didn't work. Propritery encoding of DVD's? Didn't
> work. Software that required the use of a registration key? Didn't work.
> Windows XP was shipped with this supposedly revolutionary method for
> stopping piracy, and what happened? How long was it before the code was
> cracked? How many keygens are there for Windows XP? Is someone running a
> pirated version of XP really going to use Windows Update to installed a
> service pack which breaks their OS? Just because M$ didn't include the
> change in their README? Fat chance.
My problem is not the same as MS's one, I don't have to deal with millions of
identical copy of the same CD with propably millions of working keys. Each
download can be unique with a small preparation delay. The key generator is
a problem only if multiple keys are usable. If the end users are teenagers,
you'll face a huge wall when asking to be 100% of the time online but if we
think of something like a health care system that keep track of patients
personnal information, the end user will be willing to take every possible
steps to protect the system from his own employees to use illegaly.
I agree with all of you that mass production CDs will not be safe from piracy
in a near futur. That can be seen as a collateral of mass market
penetration.
BTW thanks for all of you who provided interestiong insight. I'm playing with
gdb's dissassembler now but I don't think it's what a typical cracker would
use. Any hints on UNIX cracking tools ?
Thanks.
--
Yannick Gingras
Coder for OBB : Onside Brainsick Bract
http://OpenBeatBox.org