677 lines
40 KiB
Plaintext
677 lines
40 KiB
Plaintext
From fork-admin@xent.com Thu Oct 10 12:34:47 2002
|
||
Return-Path: <fork-admin@xent.com>
|
||
Delivered-To: yyyy@localhost.spamassassin.taint.org
|
||
Received: from localhost (jalapeno [127.0.0.1])
|
||
by jmason.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 98D4616F1F
|
||
for <jm@localhost>; Thu, 10 Oct 2002 12:33:24 +0100 (IST)
|
||
Received: from jalapeno [127.0.0.1]
|
||
by localhost with IMAP (fetchmail-5.9.0)
|
||
for jm@localhost (single-drop); Thu, 10 Oct 2002 12:33:24 +0100 (IST)
|
||
Received: from xent.com ([64.161.22.236]) by dogma.slashnull.org
|
||
(8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id g9A1omK03066 for <jm@jmason.org>;
|
||
Thu, 10 Oct 2002 02:50:52 +0100
|
||
Received: from lair.xent.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by xent.com (Postfix)
|
||
with ESMTP id 3352B2940A0; Wed, 9 Oct 2002 18:50:04 -0700 (PDT)
|
||
Delivered-To: fork@spamassassin.taint.org
|
||
Received: from mail.endeavors.com (unknown [66.161.8.83]) by xent.com
|
||
(Postfix) with ESMTP id 2409F29409A for <Fork@xent.com>; Wed,
|
||
9 Oct 2002 18:49:31 -0700 (PDT)
|
||
Received: from endeavors.com ([66.161.8.83] RDNS failed) by
|
||
mail.endeavors.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.5329); Wed,
|
||
9 Oct 2002 18:50:05 -0700
|
||
Message-Id: <3DA4DCC7.6060601@endeavors.com>
|
||
From: Gregory Alan Bolcer <gbolcer@endeavors.com>
|
||
Organization: Endeavors Technology, Inc.
|
||
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.0.1)
|
||
Gecko/20020823 Netscape/7.0
|
||
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
|
||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||
To: Rohit Khare <khare@alumni.caltech.edu>
|
||
Cc: Fork@xent.com
|
||
Subject: Re: Lord of the Ringtones: Arbocks vs. Seelecks
|
||
References: <F80BF485-DB2E-11D6-B1B1-000393A46DEA@alumni.caltech.edu>
|
||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
|
||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||
X-Originalarrivaltime: 10 Oct 2002 01:50:05.0878 (UTC) FILETIME=[5B4AFD60:01C26FFF]
|
||
Sender: fork-admin@xent.com
|
||
Errors-To: fork-admin@xent.com
|
||
X-Beenthere: fork@spamassassin.taint.org
|
||
X-Mailman-Version: 2.0.11
|
||
Precedence: bulk
|
||
List-Help: <mailto:fork-request@xent.com?subject=help>
|
||
List-Post: <mailto:fork@spamassassin.taint.org>
|
||
List-Subscribe: <http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork>, <mailto:fork-request@xent.com?subject=subscribe>
|
||
List-Id: Friends of Rohit Khare <fork.xent.com>
|
||
List-Unsubscribe: <http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork>,
|
||
<mailto:fork-request@xent.com?subject=unsubscribe>
|
||
List-Archive: <http://xent.com/pipermail/fork/>
|
||
Date: Wed, 09 Oct 2002 18:49:59 -0700
|
||
|
||
I got to see Powell talk in March 2001 at the beginning of his
|
||
reign at the FCC. He said they were going to take a real
|
||
hands off approach, so it's funny that they would blame
|
||
the regulators for causing the collapse. One thing he did
|
||
get right, is that he wasn't worried that the US was behind
|
||
Europe in the wireless licensing spectrum. This is something
|
||
very prescient in that most of those licensors have had to
|
||
eat their lunch over the huge licensing costs they paid for
|
||
very little benefit. His legacy was/is supposed to be
|
||
rethinking the FCC's role to stay out of the way in this
|
||
period of business innovation in the wireless space as he
|
||
didn't want the government forcing business models onto
|
||
the private sector.
|
||
|
||
His full transcript is here [1]. Interestingly enough I
|
||
got to see his speech in person as he was part of the whole
|
||
CTIA'2001 Las Vegas keynote series of speakers. Clay and
|
||
I hoped a flight out of Ontario to Las Vegas to do demo support
|
||
for Craig Barrett [2]. His message was that there's no difference
|
||
between wired and wireless Internet--it's all the same thing.
|
||
Instead of scalable networks, we should be thinking about scalable
|
||
content (& using Magi he showed sending a blue man tv commercial
|
||
from a desktop to a laptop to an ipaq to a color smartphone with
|
||
the content scaling back for each target platform).
|
||
|
||
The best part of the whole trip wasn't hobnobbing at all,
|
||
but really the fact that the Venetian had ran out of rooms.
|
||
They decided to put us up in one of their $10,000/night high
|
||
roller rooms. They put Clay in one and me in another.
|
||
The Venetian is known for having the largest hotel rooms
|
||
anywhere, but these ones were bigger than my whole house. 8-)
|
||
|
||
Greg
|
||
|
||
|
||
[1] http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2001/spmkp101.html
|
||
[2] http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/speeches/cb20010320.htm
|
||
|
||
Rohit Khare wrote:
|
||
> I can't believe I actually read a laugh-out-loud funny profile of the
|
||
> *FCC Commissioner* fer crissakes! So the following article comes
|
||
> recommended, a fine explanation of Michael Powell's extraordinary
|
||
> equivocation.
|
||
>
|
||
> On the other hand, I can also agree with Werbach's Werblog entry... Rohit
|
||
>
|
||
>> A Trip to F.C.C. World
|
||
>>
|
||
>> Nicholas Lemann has a piece in the New Yorker this week about FCC
|
||
>> Chairman Michael Powell. It's one of the first articles I've seen
|
||
>> that captures some of Powell's real personality, and the way he's
|
||
>> viewed in Washington. Unfortunately, Lemann ends by endorsing
|
||
>> conventional political wisdom. After describing how Powell isn't
|
||
>> really a fire-breathing ideological conservative, he concludes that,
|
||
>> in essence, Powell favors the inumbent local Bell telephone companies,
|
||
>> while a Democratic FCC would favor new entrants. I know that's not
|
||
>> how Powell sees the world, and though I disagree with him on many
|
||
>> issues, I think he's right to resist the old dichotomy.
|
||
>>
|
||
>> The telecom collapse should be a humbling experience for anyone who
|
||
>> went through it. The disaster wasn't the regulators' fault, as some
|
||
>> conservatives argue. But something clearly went horribly wrong, and
|
||
>> policy-makers should learn from that experience. Contrary to Lemann's
|
||
>> speculation, the upstart carriers won't be successful in a Gore
|
||
>> administration, because it's too late. Virtually all of them are
|
||
>> dead, and Wall Street has turned off the capital tap for the
|
||
>> foreseeable future. Some may survive, but as small players rather
|
||
>> than world-dominators.
|
||
>>
|
||
>> The battle between CLECs and RBOCs that Lemann so astutely parodies is
|
||
>> old news. The next important battle in telecom will be between those
|
||
>> who want to stay within the traditional boxes, and those who use
|
||
>> different models entirely. That's why open broadband networks and
|
||
>> open spectrum are so important. Whatever the regulatory environment,
|
||
>> there is going to be consolidation in telecom. Those left out in that
|
||
>> consolidation will face increasing pressure to create new pipes into
|
||
>> the home, or slowly die. The victors in the consolidation game will
|
||
>> cut back on innovation and raise prices, which will create further
|
||
>> pressure for alternatives.
|
||
>>
|
||
>> Lemann is right that policy-making looks much drier and more ambiguous
|
||
>> on the ground than through the lens of history. But he's wrong in
|
||
>> thinking that telecom's future will be something like its past.
|
||
>>
|
||
>> Friday, October 04, 2002
|
||
>> 11:17:11 AM comments {0}
|
||
>
|
||
>
|
||
> ==============================================================
|
||
> http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/021007fa_fact
|
||
>
|
||
> THE CHAIRMAN
|
||
> by NICHOLAS LEMANN
|
||
> He's the other Powell, and no one is sure what he's up to.
|
||
> New Yorker, October 8, 2002
|
||
>
|
||
> Last year, my middle son, in eighth grade and encountering his first
|
||
> fairly serious American-history course, indignantly reported that the
|
||
> whole subject was incomprehensible. I was shocked. What about Gettysburg
|
||
> and the Declaration of Independence and the Selma-to-Montgomery march?
|
||
> Just look at my textbook, he said, and when I did I saw his point. His
|
||
> class had got up to the eighteen-forties. What I expected was a big
|
||
> beefing up of the roles of Sacagawea and Crispus Attucks, and, in-deed,
|
||
> there was some of that. But the main difference between my son's text
|
||
> and that of my own childhood was that somebody had made the disastrous
|
||
> decision to devote most of it to what had actually happened in American
|
||
> history. There were pages and pages on tariffs and bank charters and
|
||
> reciprocal trade agreements. I skipped ahead, past the Civil War, hoping
|
||
> for easier going, only to encounter currency floats and the regulation
|
||
> of freight rates. Only a few decades into the twentieth century did it
|
||
> become possible to see the federal government's main function as
|
||
> responding to dramatic crises and launching crusades for social justice,
|
||
> instead of attempting to referee competing claims from economic interests.
|
||
>
|
||
> Even now, if one were to reveal what really goes on behind the pretty
|
||
> speeches and the sanctimonious hearings in Washington, what you'd find
|
||
> is thousands of lawyers and lobbyists madly vying for advantage, not so
|
||
> much over the public as over each other: agribusiness versus real
|
||
> estate, banks versus insurance companies, and so on. The arena in which
|
||
> this competition mainly takes place is regulatory agencies and
|
||
> commissions and the congressional committees that supervise them. It's
|
||
> an insider's game, less because the players are secretive than because
|
||
> the public and the press<73>encouraged by the players, who speak in jargon<6F>
|
||
> can't get themselves interested.
|
||
>
|
||
> One corner of Washington might be called F.C.C. World, for the Federal
|
||
> Communications Commission. F.C.C. World has perhaps five thousand
|
||
> denizens. They work at the commission itself, at the House and Senate
|
||
> commerce committees, and at the Washington offices of the companies that
|
||
> the commission regulates. They read Communications Daily (subscription
|
||
> price: $3,695 a year), and every year around Christmastime they
|
||
> grumblingly attend the Chairman's Dinner, at a Washington hotel, where
|
||
> the high point of the evening is a scripted, supposedly self-deprecating
|
||
> comedy routine by the commission's chairman.
|
||
>
|
||
> Of all the federal agencies and commissions, the F.C.C. is the one that
|
||
> Americans ought to be most interested in; after all, it is involved with
|
||
> a business sector that accounts for about fifteen per cent of the
|
||
> American economy, as well as important aspects of daily life<66>telephone
|
||
> and television and radio and newspapers and the Internet. And right now
|
||
> F.C.C. World is in, if not a crisis, at least a very soapy lather,
|
||
> because a good portion of what the angry public thinks of as the
|
||
> "corporate scandals" concerns the economic collapse of companies
|
||
> regulated by the F.C.C. Qwest, WorldCom, Adelphia, and Global Crossing,
|
||
> among others, are (or were) part of F.C.C. World. AOL Time Warner is
|
||
> part of F.C.C. World. Jack Grubman, the former Salomon Smith Barney
|
||
> analyst who seems to have succeeded Kenneth Lay, of Enron, as the
|
||
> embodiment of the corporate scandals, is part of F.C.C. World. In the
|
||
> past two years, companies belonging to F.C.C. World have lost trillions
|
||
> of dollars in stock-market valuation, and have collectively served as a
|
||
> dead weight pulling down the entire stock market.
|
||
>
|
||
> This year, an alarmed and acerbic anonymous memorandum about the state
|
||
> of the F.C.C. has been circulating widely within F.C.C. World. It evokes
|
||
> F.C.C. World's feverish mood ("The F.C.C. is fiddling while Rome burns")
|
||
> and suggests why nobody besides residents of F.C.C. World has thought of
|
||
> the commission in connection with the corporate scandals. The sentence I
|
||
> just quoted is followed by this explanation: "The ILECs appear likely to
|
||
> enter all l.d. markets within twelve months, while losing virtually no
|
||
> residential customers to attackers since 1996, and suffering about 10%
|
||
> market share loss in business lines to CLECs." It's a lot easier to
|
||
> think about evil C.E.O.s than to decipher that.
|
||
>
|
||
>
|
||
> Even in good times, F.C.C. World pays obsessive attention to the
|
||
> commission's chairman. In bad times, the attention becomes especially
|
||
> intense; and when the chairman is a celebrity F.C.C. World devotes
|
||
> itself to full-time chairman-watching. The current chairman, Michael
|
||
> Powell, is a celebrity, at least by government-official standards,
|
||
> because he is the only son of Colin Powell, the Secretary of State.
|
||
> Unlike his father, he has a kind of mesmerizing ambiguity, which
|
||
> generates enormous, and at times apoplectically toned, speculation about
|
||
> who he really is and what he's really up to. Powell is young to be the
|
||
> head of a federal agency<63>he is thirty-nine<6E>and genially charming.
|
||
> Everybody likes him. Before becoming chairman, he was for three years
|
||
> one of the F.C.C.'s five commissioners; not only is he fluent in the
|
||
> F.C.C.'s incomprehensible patois, he has a Clintonesque love of the
|
||
> arcane details of communications policy. He's always saying that he's an
|
||
> "avid moderate." And yet he has a rage-inciting quality. One of his
|
||
> predecessors as chairman, Reed Hundt, quoted in Forbes, compared Powell
|
||
> to Herbert Hoover. Mark Cooper, of the Consumer Federation of America,
|
||
> calls him "radical and extreme." Just as often as he's accused of being
|
||
> a right-wing ideologue, Powell gets accused of being paralytically
|
||
> cautious. "It ain't about singing 'Kum-Ba-Yah' around the campfire,"
|
||
> another former chairman, William Kennard, says. "You have to have an
|
||
> answer." One day last spring, Powell, testifying before a Senate
|
||
> subcommittee, delivered an anodyne opening statement, and the
|
||
> subcommittee's chairman, Ernest Hollings, of South Carolina, berated
|
||
> him. "You don't care about these regulations," Hollings said. "You don't
|
||
> care about the law or what Congress sets down. . . . That's the
|
||
> fundamental. That's the misgiving I have of your administration over
|
||
> there. It just is amazing to me. You just pell-mell down the road and
|
||
> seem to not care at all. I think you'd be a wonderful executive
|
||
> vice-president of a chamber of commerce, but not a chairman of a
|
||
> regulatory commission at the government level. Are you happy in your job?"
|
||
>
|
||
> "Extremely," Powell said, with an amiable smile.
|
||
>
|
||
>
|
||
> One cannot understand Powell's maddening effect, at least on Democrats
|
||
> and liberal activists, without understanding not just the stated purpose
|
||
> of the commission he chairs but also its real purpose. The F.C.C. was
|
||
> created by Congress in 1934, but it existed in prototype well before the
|
||
> New Deal, because it performs a function that is one of the classic easy
|
||
> cases for government intervention in the private economy: making sure
|
||
> that broadcasters stick to their assigned spots on the airwaves. Its
|
||
> other original function was preventing American Telephone & Telegraph,
|
||
> the national monopoly phone company, from treating its customers
|
||
> unfairly. Over the decades, as F.C.C. World grew up into a comfortable,
|
||
> well-established place, the F.C.C. segued into the role of industrial
|
||
> supervision<6F>its real purpose. It was supposed to manage the competition
|
||
> among communications companies so that it didn't become too bloody, by
|
||
> artfully deciding who would be allowed to enter what line of business.
|
||
> In addition to looking out for the public's interest, the commission
|
||
> more specifically protected the interests of members of Congress, many
|
||
> of whom regard the media companies in their districts as the single most
|
||
> terrifying category of interest group<75>you can cross the local bank
|
||
> president and live to tell the tale, but not the local broadcaster.
|
||
> According to an oft-told F.C.C. World anecdote, President Clinton once
|
||
> blocked an attempt to allow television stations to buy daily newspapers
|
||
> in the same city because, he said, if the so-and-so who owned the
|
||
> anti-Clinton Little Rock Democrat-Gazette had owned the leading TV
|
||
> station in Little Rock, too, Clinton would never have become President.
|
||
>
|
||
>
|
||
> F.C.C. World may have been con tentious, but it was settled, too,
|
||
> because all the reasonably powerful players had created secure economic
|
||
> niches for themselves. Then, in the nineteen-eighties, the successful
|
||
> breakup of A.T. & T.<2E>by far the biggest and most important company the
|
||
> commission regulated<65>deposited a thick additional sediment of
|
||
> self-confidence onto the consciousness of F.C.C. World. A generation
|
||
> ago, for most Americans, there was one local phone company, one
|
||
> long-distance company, and one company that manufactured telephones,
|
||
> which customers were not permitted to own<77>and they were all the same
|
||
> company. It was illegal to plug any device into a phone line. By the
|
||
> mid-nineteen-nineties, there were a dozen economically viable local
|
||
> phone companies, a handful of national long-distance companies competing
|
||
> to offer customers the lowest price and best service, and stores
|
||
> everywhere selling telephone equipment from many manufacturers<72>and
|
||
> millions of Americans had a fax machine and a modem operating over the
|
||
> telephone lines. A.T. & T. had argued for years that it was a "natural
|
||
> monopoly," requiring protection from economic competition and total
|
||
> control over its lines. So much for that argument. Over the same period,
|
||
> the F.C.C. had assisted in the birth of cable television and cell phones
|
||
> and the Internet. It was the dream of federal-agency success come true:
|
||
> consumers vastly better served, and the industry much bigger and more
|
||
> prosperous, too.
|
||
>
|
||
> The next big step was supposed to be the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
|
||
> one of those massive, endlessly lobbied-over pieces of legislation which
|
||
> most people outside F.C.C. World probably felt it was safe to ignore.
|
||
> Although the Telecom Act sailed under the rhetorical banner of
|
||
> modernization and deregulation, its essence was a grand interest-group
|
||
> bargain, in which the local phone companies, known to headline writers
|
||
> as "baby Bells" and to F.C.C. World as "arbocks" (the pronounced version
|
||
> of RBOCs, or regional Bell operating companies), would be permitted to
|
||
> offer long-distance service in exchange for letting the long-distance
|
||
> companies and smaller new phone companies use their lines to compete for
|
||
> customers. Consumers would win, because for the first time they would
|
||
> get the benefits of competition in local service while getting even more
|
||
> competition than they already had in long distance. But the politics and
|
||
> economics of the Telecom Act (which was shepherded through Congress by
|
||
> Vice-President Gore) were just as important. Democrats saw the act as
|
||
> helping to reposition them as the technology party<74>the party that
|
||
> brought the Internet into every home, created hundreds of thousands of
|
||
> jobs in new companies, and, not least, set off an investment boom whose
|
||
> beneficiaries might become the party's new contributor base. Clinton's
|
||
> slogans about the "information superhighway" and "building a bridge to
|
||
> the twenty-first century," which, like all Clinton slogans, artfully
|
||
> sent different messages to different constituencies, were the rhetorical
|
||
> correlates of the Telecom Act, and Gore's cruise to the Presidency was
|
||
> supposed to be powered substantially by the act's success.
|
||
>
|
||
> The F.C.C. had a crucial role in all this. The arbocks are rich,
|
||
> aggressive, politically powerful, and generally Republican (though like
|
||
> all important interest groups they work with both parties); they
|
||
> immediately filed lawsuits, which wound up tying the hands of their new
|
||
> competitors in the local phone market for more than three years. Through
|
||
> rule-making, enforcement, and litigation, the F.C.C., then headed by
|
||
> Reed Hundt, who was Gore's classmate at St. Albans, was supposed to keep
|
||
> the arbocks in their cages, so that not only long-distance companies
|
||
> like A.T. & T. and MCI WorldCom but also a whole category of new
|
||
> companies, "see-lecks" (the pronounced version of CLECs, or competitive
|
||
> local exchange carriers), could emerge. This entailed the regulatory
|
||
> equivalent of hand-to-hand combat: the see-leck is supposed to have
|
||
> access to the arbock's switching equipment, the arbock won't give the
|
||
> seeleck a key to the room where it's kept, so the see-leck asks the
|
||
> F.C.C. to rule that the arbock has to give it the key.
|
||
>
|
||
> Partly because Hundt assured the see-lecks and other new companies that
|
||
> he would protect them, and partly because of the generally booming
|
||
> condition of the economy then, investment capital flooded into the
|
||
> see-lecks<6B>companies with names like Winstar, Covad, and Teligent<6E>and
|
||
> into other telecommunications companies. Even not obviously related
|
||
> technology companies like Cisco Systems benefitted from the telecom
|
||
> boom: demand for their products was supposed to come from the see-lecks
|
||
> and other new players. There would be no conflict between the interests
|
||
> of the new telecom companies and those of consumers; as one of Hundt's
|
||
> former lieutenants told me, "Reed used to joke that my job was to make
|
||
> sure that all prices went down and all stocks went up."
|
||
>
|
||
>
|
||
> The years following the passage of the Telecom Act were the peak of the
|
||
> boom. Wall Street had its blood up, and that meant not just more
|
||
> startups but also more mergers of existing communications companies:
|
||
> Time Warner and AOL decided to throw in together, and A.T. & T. and
|
||
> Comcast, and so on. (Surely, WorldCom and the other telecom bad guys
|
||
> believed that their self-dealing, stock-overselling, and creative
|
||
> accounting would go unnoticed because the market was so undiscriminating.)
|
||
>
|
||
> By the time the outcome of the 2000 Presidential election had been
|
||
> determined, the telecom crash was well under way. Nonetheless, the
|
||
> chairmanship of the F.C.C. remained one of the best jobs, in terms of
|
||
> influence and visibility, available to a career government regulator.
|
||
> Three Republicans emerged as candidates: Powell, who was a commissioner;
|
||
> Harold Furchtgott-Roth, the farthest-to-the-right commissioner; and
|
||
> Patrick Wood, the head of the Texas Public Utility Commission and, as
|
||
> such, a George W. Bush guy. In Texas, however, Wood had crossed the most
|
||
> powerful person in the arbock camp, Edward Whitacre, the C.E.O. of
|
||
> S.B.C. Communications, which is headquartered in San Antonio. This meant
|
||
> that the arbocks didn't want Wood as head of the F.C.C., because he
|
||
> might be too pro-see-leck. (Wood is now the head of the Federal Energy
|
||
> Regulatory Commission.) Michael Powell had to signal the arbocks that he
|
||
> wasn't as threatening as Wood, while also signalling the conservative
|
||
> movement that he was only negligibly farther to the left than
|
||
> Furchtgott-Roth.
|
||
>
|
||
> Powell did this deftly. For example, in December of 2000 he appeared
|
||
> before a conservative group called the Progress & Freedom Foundation and
|
||
> gave a very Michael Powell speech<63>whimsical, intellectual, and
|
||
> free-associative (Biblical history, Joseph Schumpeter, Moore's Law)<29>that
|
||
> began by making fun of the idea that the F.C.C. should try to keep new
|
||
> telecom companies alive. "In the wake of the 1996 Act, the F.C.C. is
|
||
> often cast as the Grinch who stole Christmas," Powell said. "Like the
|
||
> Whos, down in Who-ville, who feast on Who-pudding and rare Who-roast
|
||
> beast, the communications industry was preparing to feast on the
|
||
> deregulatory fruits it believed would inevitably sprout from the Act's
|
||
> fertile soil. But this feast the F.C.C. Grinch did not like in the
|
||
> least, so it is thought." Thus Powell was indicating that if he became
|
||
> chairman he didn't expect to administer first aid to the see-lecks as
|
||
> part of the job. He was appointed to the chairmanship on the first day
|
||
> of the Bush Administration.
|
||
>
|
||
> Twenty months into the Administration, nearly all the see-lecks are dead
|
||
> or dying; nearly all long-distance companies, not just WorldCom, are in
|
||
> serious trouble; cable companies have lost half their value; satellite
|
||
> companies are staggering. The crash has had an automatically
|
||
> concentrating effect, because as new companies die the existing
|
||
> companies' market share increases, and, if the existing companies are in
|
||
> good shape financially, they have the opportunity to pick up damaged
|
||
> companies at bargain prices. During the Bush Administration, as the
|
||
> financial carnage in communications has worsened, the communications
|
||
> industry has moved in the direction of more concentration. If the Bells
|
||
> wind up protecting their regional monopolies in local phone service, and
|
||
> if they also merge, the country will be on its way to having a national
|
||
> duopoly in local service: Verizon, in the East, and S.B.C., in the West.
|
||
> And these companies could dominate long distance as well, because of the
|
||
> poor health of the long-distance companies.
|
||
>
|
||
> The cable business also seems close to having two dominant national
|
||
> companies, AOL Time Warner and Comcast. Unlike the phone companies, they
|
||
> don't have to share their wiring with other companies and so can more
|
||
> fully control what material they allow to enter people's homes. As part
|
||
> of the complicated bargaining with interest groups that led to the 1996
|
||
> Telecom Act, the limits on concentration in the radio industry were
|
||
> significantly loosened, and in the past six years the number of
|
||
> radio-station owners in the United States has been cut by twenty-five
|
||
> per cent; today, a large portion of local and national radio news
|
||
> programming is supplied by a single company, Westwood One, a subsidiary
|
||
> of Viacom.
|
||
>
|
||
> In this situation, many Democrats and liberals think, the F.C.C. should
|
||
> be hyperactive<76>the superhero of government regulation, springing to the
|
||
> rescue of both consumers and the communications industry. It should try
|
||
> to breathe life into the see-lecks and other new companies. It should
|
||
> disallow mergers, maintain ownership limits, and otherwise restrain the
|
||
> forces of concentration. It should use the government's money and muscle
|
||
> to get new technology<67>especially fast Internet connections<6E>into the
|
||
> homes of people who can't afford it at current market prices. (An
|
||
> analogy that a lot of people in F.C.C. World make is between telecom and
|
||
> the Middle East: the Clinton people blame the bloodshed on the Bush
|
||
> people, because they disengaged when they came into office, and the Bush
|
||
> people blame it on the Clinton people, because they raised too many
|
||
> expectations and stirred too many passions.)
|
||
>
|
||
> But Michael Powell's F.C.C. has not been hyperactive. Powell has been
|
||
> conducting internal policy reviews and reforming the management of the
|
||
> F.C.C. and waiting for the federal courts and the Congress to send him
|
||
> signals. (In mid-September, Powell finally initiated a formal review of
|
||
> the F.C.C.'s limits on media concentration.) This doesn't mean he has
|
||
> been inactive; rather, he has been active in a way that further
|
||
> infuriates his critics<63>in a manner that smoothly blends the genial and
|
||
> the provocative, he muses about whether the fundamental premises of
|
||
> F.C.C. World really make sense, while giving the impression that he's
|
||
> having the time of his life as chairman. At his first press conference,
|
||
> when he was asked what he was going to do about the "digital
|
||
> divide"<22>that is, economic inequality in access to the Internet<65>he said,
|
||
> "You know, I think there is a Mercedes divide. I'd like to have one and
|
||
> I can't afford one." At the National Cable & Telecommunications
|
||
> Association convention, in Chicago, Powell, following a troupe of
|
||
> tumblers to the stage, interrupted his walk to the podium to perform a
|
||
> somersault.
|
||
>
|
||
>
|
||
> Not long ago, I went to see Powell in his office at the F.C.C. Until
|
||
> 1998, when the commission moved to a new building in Southwest
|
||
> Washington, near the city's open-air fish market, F.C.C. World was at
|
||
> the western edge of downtown, where everybody would encounter everybody
|
||
> else at a few familiar restaurants and bars. Today, the F.C.C. building
|
||
> looks like the office of a mortgage company in a suburban office park.
|
||
> Even the chairman's suite, though large, is beige, carpeted, and
|
||
> fluorescent. Powell is a bulky man who wears gold-rimmed glasses and
|
||
> walks with a pronounced limp, the result of injuries he suffered in a
|
||
> jeep accident in Germany, in 1987, when he was an Army officer. Because
|
||
> of the accident, he left the Army and went to law school, where he
|
||
> became entranced with conservative ideas about regulation, particularly
|
||
> the idea that the government, rather than trying to correct the flaws of
|
||
> the market before the fact<63>"prophylactically," as he likes to say<61>should
|
||
> wait till the flaws manifest themselves and then use antitrust
|
||
> litigation to fix them. He worked briefly at a corporate law firm, and
|
||
> then became a prot<6F>g<EFBFBD> of Joel Klein, the head of the antitrust division
|
||
> of the Clinton Justice Department and the man who led the government's
|
||
> legal case against Microsoft. (He was recently appointed chancellor of
|
||
> the New York public-school system.) It testifies to Powell's political
|
||
> skill that he is probably the only high official in the Bush
|
||
> Administration who not only served in the Clinton Administration but
|
||
> also maintains close ties to Bush's nemesis Senator John McCain, of
|
||
> Arizona. One of the things about Powell that annoy people is his
|
||
> enduring love of law school<6F>"It's sort of like a law-school study
|
||
> session over there," one Democratic former commissioner said. As if to
|
||
> confirm the charge, Powell, when I arrived, introduced me to four law
|
||
> students, summer interns at the commission, whom he'd invited to sit in.
|
||
>
|
||
> I began by asking Powell whether he agreed with the founding assumptions
|
||
> of the F.C.C. For example, could private companies have apportioned the
|
||
> airwaves among themselves without the government being involved?
|
||
>
|
||
> "I think we'll never know," Powell said. "I don't think it's an
|
||
> automatically bad idea, the way some people will argue. Land is probably
|
||
> the best analogue. We don't seize all the land in the United States and
|
||
> say, 'The government will issue licenses to use land.' If my neighbor
|
||
> puts a fence one foot onto my property line, there's a whole body of law
|
||
> about what I can do about that, including whether I can tear it down. If
|
||
> a wireless company was interfering with another wireless company, it's a
|
||
> similar proposition. There are scholars who argue<75>indeed, the famous
|
||
> Ronald Coase treatise that won the Nobel Prize was about this<69>that
|
||
> spectrum policy is lunacy. The market could work this out, in the kinds
|
||
> of ways that we're accustomed to."
|
||
>
|
||
> Talking to Powell was fun. Unlike most high government officials, he
|
||
> doesn't seem to be invested in appearing dignified or commanding. He
|
||
> slumps in his chair and fiddles with his tie and riffs. He speaks in
|
||
> ironic air quotes. He's like your libertarian friend in college who
|
||
> enjoyed staying up all night asking impertinent rhetorical questions
|
||
> about aspects of life that everybody else takes for granted but that he
|
||
> sees as sentimental or illogical. After a while, I asked him whether he
|
||
> thought his predecessors' excitement about the 1996 Telecommunications
|
||
> Act had been excessive.
|
||
>
|
||
> "I would start with a caveat," Powell said. "Look, I can't fault those
|
||
> judgments in and of themselves, given the time and what people thought.
|
||
> They were not the only ones who were hysterical about the opportunities.
|
||
> But, frankly, I've always been a little bit critical. First of all,
|
||
> anybody who works with the act knows that it doesn't come anywhere close
|
||
> to matching the hyperbole that was associated with it, by the President
|
||
> on down, about the kinds of things it's going to open up. I mean, I
|
||
> don't know what provisions are the information-superhighway provisions,
|
||
> or what provisions are so digitally oriented, or some of the things that
|
||
> were a big part of the theatre of its introduction. When one starts
|
||
> reading the details, one searches, often in vain, for these provisions.
|
||
> But, nonetheless, there was a rising dot-com excitement, and an Internet
|
||
> excitement, and people thought this was historic legislation, and it
|
||
> certainly was.
|
||
>
|
||
> "But. We were sucking helium out of balloons, with the kinds of
|
||
> expectations that were being bandied around, and this is before the
|
||
> economy or the market even gets in trouble. It was a dramatically
|
||
> exaggerated expectation<6F>by the leadership of the commission, by
|
||
> politicians, by the market itself, by companies themselves. It was a
|
||
> gold rush, and led to some very detrimental business decisions, ones
|
||
> that government encouraged by its policies, frankly. Everybody wanted to
|
||
> see numbers go up on the board."
|
||
>
|
||
> Powell began imitating an imagined true believer in the Telecom Act. "
|
||
> 'I want to see ten competitors. Twenty competitors! I want to see
|
||
> thirty-per-cent market share. Fifty-per-cent market share! I want the
|
||
> Bells to bleed! Then we'll know we've succeeded.' " Now Powell returned
|
||
> to being Powell. "I think that expectation was astonishingly
|
||
> unrealistic, in the short term. They wanted to see it while they're
|
||
> there. We were starting to get drunk on the juice we were drinking. And
|
||
> the market was getting drunk on the juice we were drinking. There's no
|
||
> question, we went too soon too fast. Too many companies took on too much
|
||
> debt too fast before the market really had a product, or a business model."
|
||
>
|
||
> How could the Telecom Act have been handled better? "We could have
|
||
> chosen policies that were less hellbent on a single objective, and were
|
||
> slightly more balanced and put more economic discipline in the system,"
|
||
> Powell said. "Money chased what seemed like government-promised
|
||
> opportunity. The problem with that is there's a morning after, and we're
|
||
> in it. And the problem is there is no short fix for this problem. This
|
||
> debt is going to take years to bring down to a realistic level. In some
|
||
> ways, for short-term gain, we paid a price in long-term stability."
|
||
>
|
||
> Powell went on to say that it might have turned out differently if there
|
||
> had been a more "reasonable" level of investment. "No, we wouldn't have
|
||
> every home in America with competitive choice yet<65>but we don't anyway. I
|
||
> don't think it's the remonopolization of telephone service. I don't buy
|
||
> that. The Bells will prosper, but did anybody believe they wouldn't? The
|
||
> part of the story that didn't materialize was that people thought so
|
||
> would MCI WorldCom and Sprint."
|
||
>
|
||
> Other local phone companies, he added, hadn't materialized as viable
|
||
> businesses, either, and they never might. "Everybody's always saying,
|
||
> 'The regulators did this and this and this.' But, candidly, the story's
|
||
> quite the opposite. I think the regulators bent over backward for six
|
||
> years to give them a chance. Conditions don't get that good except once
|
||
> every thirty years, and it didn't happen. So, whatever the reason, we're
|
||
> looking at a WorldCom that's teetering. We're looking at a long-distance
|
||
> business that has had a rapid decline in its revenue base. A.T. & T. is
|
||
> breaking itself up. Sprint has struggled."
|
||
>
|
||
> Could the F.C.C. have done anything to make the long-distance companies
|
||
> stronger? "At the F.C.C.? I think I'll just be blunt. My political
|
||
> answer? Yes, there's all kinds of things we can do at the margin to try
|
||
> to help. But I can't find thirty billion dollars for WorldCom somewhere.
|
||
> I can't mitigate the impacts of an accounting scandal and an S.E.C.
|
||
> investigation. Were I king, it would be wonderful, but I don't have
|
||
> those kinds of levers. I don't know whether anybody does. At some point,
|
||
> companies are expected to run themselves in a way that keeps them from
|
||
> dying." Powell couldn't have made it much clearer that he doesn't think
|
||
> it's his responsibility to do anything about the telecom crash. He has
|
||
> demonstrated his sure political touch by making accommodationist
|
||
> gestures<65>in August, for example, five months after disbanding the
|
||
> F.C.C.'s Accounting Safeguards Division, Powell announced that he was
|
||
> appointing a committee to study accounting standards in the
|
||
> communications industry. But that shows that Powell is better at riding
|
||
> out the storm than, say, Harvey Pitt, his counterpart at the Securities
|
||
> and Exchange Commission, and does not mean that he plans to try to shore
|
||
> up the telecom industry.
|
||
>
|
||
> I asked Powell if it would bother him if, for most people, only one
|
||
> company provided cable television and only one provided local phone
|
||
> service. "Yes," he said. "It concerns us that there's one of each of
|
||
> those things, but let's not diminish the importance of there being one
|
||
> of each of those things. That still is a nice suite of communications
|
||
> capabilities, even if they aren't direct analogues of each other."
|
||
> Anyway, Powell said, before long the phone companies will be able to
|
||
> provide video service over their lines, and the cable companies will
|
||
> provide data service over their lines, so there will be more choice.
|
||
> "So, yeah, we have this anxiety: we have one of everything. The question
|
||
> is, Does it stay that way?"
|
||
>
|
||
> The concentration of ownership and the concentrated control of
|
||
> information did not appear to trouble Powell, either. He said that
|
||
> people confuse bigness, which brings many benefits, with concentration,
|
||
> which distorts markets. "If this were just economics, it's easy. If you
|
||
> were to say to me, 'Mike, just worry about economic concentration,' we
|
||
> know how to do that<61>the econometrics of antitrust. I can tell you when a
|
||
> market's too concentrated and prices are going to rise. The problem is
|
||
> other dimensions, like political, ideological, sometimes emotional. Take
|
||
> the question of, if everybody's controlling what you see, the assumption
|
||
> there is that somehow there'll be this viewpoint, a monolithic
|
||
> viewpoint, pushed on you by your media and you won't get diversity. I
|
||
> think that's a possibility. I don't think it's nearly the possibility
|
||
> that's ascribed to it sometimes."
|
||
>
|
||
> Powell explained, "Sometimes when we see very pointed political or
|
||
> parochial programming, it gets attacked as unfair. I see some of the
|
||
> same people who claim they want diversity go crazy when Rush Limbaugh
|
||
> exists. They love diversity, but somehow we should run Howard Stern off
|
||
> the planet. If it has a point of view, then it becomes accused of bias,
|
||
> and then we have policies like"<22>here his tone went from ironic to
|
||
> sarcastic<69>"the fairness doctrine, which seems to me like the antithesis
|
||
> of what I thought those people cared about. So when somebody is pointed
|
||
> and opinionated, we do all this stuff in the name of journalistic
|
||
> fairness and integrity or whatever, to make them balance it out."
|
||
>
|
||
>
|
||
> F.C.C. World abounds in theories about Michael Powell. One is that he
|
||
> can't make up his mind about how to address the crisis in the industries
|
||
> he regulates<65>so he talks (and talks and talks) flamboyantly about the
|
||
> market, in order to buy himself time. Another is that he's carrying
|
||
> water for the arbocks and the big cable companies. Another is that he is
|
||
> planning to run for the Senate from Virginia (or to be appointed
|
||
> Attorney General in a second Bush term), and doesn't want to do anything
|
||
> at the F.C.C. that would diminish his chances. Another is that he's
|
||
> waiting to move until there is more consensus on some course of action,
|
||
> so that he doesn't wind up going first and getting caught in the
|
||
> crossfire between the arbocks and the cable companies and the television
|
||
> networks. (In F.C.C. World, this is known as the Powell Doctrine of
|
||
> Telecom, after Colin Powell's idea that the United States should never
|
||
> commit itself militarily without a clear objective, overwhelming force,
|
||
> and an exit strategy.) And another is that he actually believes what he
|
||
> says, and thinks the telecommunications crash is natural, healthy, and
|
||
> irreversible, and more concentration would be just fine.
|
||
>
|
||
> "This is why elections matter," Reed Hundt, who isn't happy about what
|
||
> has become of his Telecom Act, told me. It's true that the F.C.C.<2E>much
|
||
> more than, say, the war in Afghanistan<61>is a case in which a Gore
|
||
> Administration would be acting quite differently from the Bush
|
||
> Administration. Consumers might have noticed the difference by now, but
|
||
> there's no question whether communications companies have noticed. The
|
||
> arbocks are doing better against their internal rivals than they would
|
||
> have done if Gore had won. Next election, they'll help the party that
|
||
> helped them. If the Republicans win, policy will tilt further in the
|
||
> arbocks' favor. If they lose, perhaps the arbocks' rivals<6C>the
|
||
> long-distance companies and the telecommunications upstarts<74>with their
|
||
> friends now in power, will stage a comeback. America's present is not
|
||
> unrecognizably different from America's past.
|
||
>
|
||
>
|
||
|
||
|
||
--
|
||
Gregory Alan Bolcer, CTO | work: +1.949.833.2800
|
||
gbolcer at endeavors.com | http://endeavors.com
|
||
Endeavors Technology, Inc.| cell: +1.714.928.5476
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|